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Summary findings
Schmukler and Vesperoni investigate whether  integration  On the other hand, domestic firms that actually
with global markets affects the financing choices of firms  participate in international markets get better financing
from East Asia and Latin America. Using firm-level data  opportunities  and extend their debt maturity.
for the 1980s and  1990s, they study how leverage ratios,  Moreover,  firms in economies with deeper dornestic
the structure of debt maturity, and sources of financing  financial systems are affected less by financial
change when economies are liberalized and when firms  liberalization.
gain access to international equity and bond markets.  Finally, they show that leverage ratios increase during
The evidence shows that integration with world  times of crisis.
financial markets has uneven effects.  In an appendix, they analyze the previously unstudied
On the one hand, debt maturity for the average firm  case of Argentina, which experienced sharp financial
shortens when countries undertake  financial  liberalization and was hit hard by all recent global crises.
liberalization.
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The late 1,980s  and 1990s  witnessed  unprecedented  developments  in the financial
sector of emerging economies.  Emerging  markets became more open and integrated  with
the rest oif  the world. After lifting restrictions on capital movements,  countries received
record high levels of capital inflow. During the 1970-80s, capital flows were mainly
directed  to govermnents  or to the private  sector  throughl  the  btanking  system.  Whereas,  in the
1990s, capital flows took the form of foreign direct investment and portfolio flows,
including  'bond  and equity flows. Companies  in emerging  markets are now participating  in
international  financial  markets. Equity trading is shifting from local domestic markets to
international  markets. As financial markets became more global, a remarkable series of
financial crises occurred, with significant spillover effects across countries. Countries
open to financial  flows  were severely  affected  by swings in international  financial  markets.
Even though the recent events have generated a vast literature on globalization,
financial liberalization,  and financial crises, there is very little empirical evidence at the
corporate  'level.  The goal of this paper is to study the r  elationship  between  firms' financing
choices anid  global financial integration.  We focus on emrierging  economies, which are
rapidly integrating  with world markets. Both macroeconomic  and microeconomic  factors
determine  a  country's  financial  integration within  the  world  economy. At  the
macroeconomic  or country level, we evaluate the impact of financial liberalization on
financial structure. We also study the effects of financial crises and domestic financial
development  on firms' financing.  At the microeconomic  or firm level, we examine  how
firms' access  to international  debt and equity  markets is associated  with financial  structure.
Additionally,  we analyze  differences  between  bank-based  and market-based  systems.  The
Iappendix  section  presents  the results for the case of Argentina,  a country  not studied  by the
existing  literature, which experienced  a marked liberalization  process and was hit hard by
the recent crises.
Financial  choices (or financial structure)  are characterized  by the following  ratios:
debt over equity, short-term  debt over equity, long-term  debt over equity, short-term  debt
over total debt, and retained  eamings over total liabilities.  ' To study  the effects  of fmancial
integration  on financial structure, this paper uses a novel data set. We construct  a large
panel of non-financial  companies  located in East Asia and Latin America.  We work with
seven emerging countries that have experienced financial liberalization and crises. Our
data comprise firms from Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia,  Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea,
and Thailand.  The data cover  the 1980s  and 1990s.  Thus, we are able to compare  pre and
post liberalization  periods. We gather data on balance sheets, firm specific characteristics,
and the actual  participation  of companies  in international  bond and equity  markets.
The recent events in emerging economies  and the ongoing debate in the financial
and international  economics  literature  are the main motivations  for this paper.  The current:
literature on financial structure studies the effects of firms'  characteristics,  financial
institutions,  and legal institutions  on firms' financing  decisions.  In particular,  the literature
concentrates  on the choice between debt and equity and the maturity structure of debt.
Potential conflicts of interests between holders of different securities and certain specific;
characteristics  of firms might affect agency costs associated with available financial
instruments.  Demirgiuc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1994)  and Aivazian,  Booth,  Demirgiiu-Kunt,
'  Note that the term "financing  choices"  in this paper is what other  papers  on corporate  finance call
"financial  structure."  In this paper, we use both terms as synonyms.  However,  the term "financial
2and Maksimovic  (1999) empirically study these issues by working with 10 developing
countries,  mostly during the 1980s.  Our data set, which includes  the 1990s,  enables  us to
expand tfhis literature by analyzing the effect of financial liberalization and crises on
financial  structure.  Also, the data on access  to global capital  markets enable  us to study  the
effects of financial  integration  at the firm  level.
'This  paper also sheds light on the finance  literature,  which studies  the efficiency  of
different financial systems in  the  intermediation  between saving and  investment. In
particular,  the literature discusses  the pros and cons of baik-based vis-a-vis market-based
models of organization. 2 The evaluation  of managers  and firms performnance  on the part of
lenders niay be an expensive activity.  Therefore,  there is a trade-off between liquidity of
financial  instruments  and control  of debtors. While rnarket-based  systems are better suited
to offer liquid financial instruments  to investors, bank-based  systems promote long-term
relationships  between intermediaries  and borrowers  and facilitate corporate control. This
implies that the different systems may be better at providing funds for different firms.
Banks may be well prepared to fund start-up firms, while public markets can be better
prepared to finance established firms, typically withl  more tangible assets. 4 Our data set
enables us to study whether  firns'  financing  choices are dlifferent  in countries  with bank-
based and market-based  systems. Also, we can stucly  whether access to more developed
financial  markets  affects  bank-based  and market-based  systems  differently.
structure" is also used to denote differences in the composition of financial systems-for  example, bank-
based vs. market-based  fnancial systems.
See Demirgi%q-Kunt  and Levine (1997).
Financia]. securities, which are  quickly and cheaply exc&langed  in the  market, can  save resources
allocated to exercise some control over corporations. See Bhide (1993).
4The  need to monitor firms might lead banks to provide stage financing. This type of financing enables
banks  to monitor  firms  at different  stages  of the investment  projects.  So, the characteristics  of long-term
3Finally, this paper provides new  evidence for the literature on  international
finance, which studies financial and balance of payments  crises. The literature argues that
financial  liberalization  can lead to over borrowing syndromes,  increasing  the likelihood  of
crises. McKinnon  and Pill (1997)  claim  that implicit government  guarantees  might prompt
banks to engage in moral hazard lending and drive economies  to over-investment  cycles.
Kaminsky  and Reinhart  (1999) suggest  that financial  liberalization  can fuel lending booms
and produce exaggerated business cycles that lead to financial crises. Krugman (1999)
argues that the deterioration  of firms' balance sheets may have played a crucial  role in the
late Asian crisis.
The existing empirical literature in international  finance only looks at aggregate-
level evidence.  We complement  this literature  by providing valuable  evidence at the firm
level, which gives us further insights in the process of financial integration. We can
directly observe  whether aggregate  effects-like  financial liberalization  and crises-affect
the firms' financing  choices. Moreover,  by concentrating  on the micro level, we can study
differences across firms within the same macro framework. For example, do firms that
access international financial markets change their leverage levels and  the maturity
composition  of their debt?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses  the data and
methodology  used in the paper. Section III describes  the effects of financial  liberalization
on financing  choices.  It also analyzes  the effects of financial  integration  when firms access
and list in international  capital markets. Section IV presents the evidence  for bank-based
and market-based financial systems. Section V  summarizes the results and concludes.
lender-borrower  relationships  in bank-based  fmancing  systems do not necessary  imply long-term
4Finally, the appendix section presents in detail the case of Argentina and provides a
literature review.
II. Data ind Methodology
II.a Data Description
Our sample contains data on firms from seven emerging economies:  Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, 'Indonesia,  Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand.  The countries in the
sample are  of  particular interest, since they have undergone periods  of  financial
repression, follovved  by financial liberalization  and crises. Data on firms' balance sheets
come fram two sources, the corporate finance database of the Intemational Finance
Corporation  (]FC) and WorldScope.  IFC has comple:e  dataL  for the 1980s;  WorldScope  has
a large data set for mid and late 1990s.  The data set contains a total of 1,973 firms. After
removing  outliers  and firms that are in the sample for less than three years, we are left with
around 800 firms..
To  compare the pre-liberalization  period (mainly the  1980s) with the  post-
liberalization  period (mainly the 1990s),  we combine  data from both sources.  Our sample
comprises annual balance sheet data of publicly traded firms, from  1980 to  1999.5
Previous worlk  oni  corporate finance, notably Demirigu9-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1995 and
1998)  and Aivazian,  Booth, Demirguc-Kunt,  and Maksimovic  (1999),  use similar data but
only for the 1980s.  We also add the case of Argentina,  which was  not studied  before.
The data set contains detailed information  on the capital structure of firms, but it
does not  include sources and uses-of-funds statements. We exclude from the sample
liabilities.
5financial  firms and banks, given  that there is lack of information  on the maturity  structure  of
time deposits and we are particularly interested about debt maturity. We also eliminate
from the sample firms for which we have information  for less than three periods. Given
that available data only exist for publicly traded firms, we are mostly studying large
companies. 6
To measure fmancial  integration  at the firm level, we construct  indicators  of access
to international  bond and equity  markets.  First, we use data on international  bond issues by
firms from emerging economies.  The data come from the database of H. Kalsi and A.
Mody, World Bank Prospects Group, and JP Morgan. The data measure the access to
international  bond markets. Second,  to capture access  to international  equity  markets, we
use the proportional value traded on American Depositary  Receipts (ADRs), in the New
York Stock Exchange, and on Global Depositary  Receipts (GDRs), in the London Stock
Exchange. This proportion is calculated  relative to the total value traded for that firm's
equity  in all markets.  Data  on ADRs and GDRs  come from Bloomberg.'
To measure financial liberalization  in these economies,  we employ the index of
financial controls constructed  by Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999). This is a qualitative
multidimensional  index of financial  liberalization.  The index takes into account  controls  on
interest rates, legal restrictions for firms and banks to borrow in foreign markets, level of
5Appendix  2 presents, for each country, the number of firms and time periods covered in the sample.
6Data  on publicly traded firms exist because firms have to submit their balance sheets regularly to the
stock market authorities of each country. Accounting standards for other firns  are different and there is
no centralized agency that collects such data. if the data existed, it would be very interesting to analyze
those firms.
7  Given the data availability, it is very difficult to  obtain the proportional value traded of  bonds in
international  markets, as we do for equity trading. That is why we use a dummy variable for access to
international  bond markets. Also, there is no publicly available data on the arnount of outstanding ADRs
and GDRs.  That is why we use the value traded as a proxy for access to international  equity markets.
6reserve requirements,  and restrictions  for residents  to acquire assets in foreign currency.
High values  of the index  stand for high levels  of finan,cial  liberalization.
To  test whether financial choices for firms in  bank-based and market-based
economies are different,  we use the criteria in Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Levine (1999). They
classify countries  according  to the characteristics  of their financial  sector. Following  their
classification,  Argentina and Indonesia are bank-based financial systems, while Brazil,
Mexico,  K.orea,  Malaysia  and Thailand  are market-based  financial  systems.
Il.b Stylized  Facts
Before proceeding  with the econometric analysis,  we present a general overview
on the belhavior  of different  ratios  that characterize  firms' financing  choices.  We focus here
on two issues.  First, we briefly describe  the effects of international  financial  integration  on
debt-equity  ratios and the maturity structure  of debt contracts. Second,  we contrast firms'
financial structure  in  bank-based and  market-based economies. We  organize our
description in Figures I-Ill. These figures portray average debt-equity  ratios (for total,
short-term,  and long-term  debt) and the proportion  of short--term  debt over total debt for the
seven emerging  economies  under consideration.
Fiigure  I shows annual average debt-equity  ratios and maturity structure of firms
with and without access to international  bond markets. The data suggest that debt-equity
ratios of firms with access  to international  markets  are clearly  higher during  the 1980s  than
during the  1990s. Debt-equity ratios may be  reflecting the  sharp development and
increasing  importance  of equity  financing  in emerging  economies  during  the 1990s.
7Figure I also indicates  that firms with access to international  bond markets have
higher values of long-term  debt over equity  and longer maturity  structure,  relative to firms
with no  access to  international bond markets. More notably, firms with  access to
international  markets have a marked lower proportion of short-term  debt over total debt
after 1991. The difference  in maturity  structure  between finns with and without access to
international  bond markets increases  over time, as financial  integration  deepens.
During the 1990s,  bond markets for firms from emerging economies developed,
allowing  these firms to issue long-term debt. Accordingly,  the financing  choices for firms
with access  to international  markets have changed in relation to the other firms' financial
structure.  The picture suggests that it is the evolution of long-term debt what makes the
difference  in the maturity  structure.
Figure II presents annual average  debt-equity  ratios and maturity  structure  of firms
with and without access to international  equity markets. Since the access of emerging
economies  to international  markets is a very recent phenomenon,  we can only look at the
effects  of international  equity financing  during  the 1990s.  The data suggest  that there is not
a clear difference in the behavior of total debt-equity  ratios of firms with and without
access to equity markets. However, the figure also indicates  that firms with access to
international  equity  markets have more long-term  debt and less short-term  debt than firms
with  no  access. As  a  consequence, the maturity structure of  firms with  access to
international  equity  markets is longer.
Figure III shows annual average  debt-equity  ratios and maturity  structure  of firms in
bank-based  and market-based  financial systems.  These pictures offer two messages about
the behavior  of finns' financial  structure.  First, debt-equity  ratios are consistently  higher in
8market-based  economies.  This relation  holds both for short-term  and long-term  debt. This
is a surpiising,  fact, given that one would expect e uity values (relative to debt) to be
higher  in  market-based economies. Perhaps,  bank-based economies are  liquidity
constrained,  with banks  not issuing  enough  credit to firms. Second,  there are no significant
differences  in the maturity  structure  of debt  in bank-based  and market-based  economies.
As discussed in the introduction,  market-based  systems are better suited to offer
liquid financial instruments to investors, while batik-based systems promote long-te,rm
relationships between lenders and borrowers.  Two possible explanations  for this finding
are as follows. Ale explanation  is that greater liquidity does not necessarily imply short-
term financial  instruments.  In fact, market-based  syste,ms  are capable  to create markets  that
offer liquidity  to long-term  financial  instruments.  The second explanation  is related  to stage
financing,  as explained  by Stulz  (1998). This kind of financing  does not necessarily  iimply
that  long-term lending relationships entail long-term financial instruments, because
creditors  imight  want to monitor  debtors at different  stages.  These explanations  suggest  that
one might not necessarily expect short-term liabilities in market-based  economies and
long-termv  liabilities  in bank-based  systems.
II.c Variables and Methodology
The present paper studies three fundamental characteristics  of firms'  financial
structure by  estimating models with  five  different dependent variables. The  three
fundamental  characteristics  are: (i) the choice between de'bt  and equity financing, (ii) the
maturity  structure  of debt, and (iii) the choice between  internal  and external  financing.  The
five dependent variables are as follows. The variable debt-equity  tracks the evolution of
9total debt and is defined as the ratio between  total liabilities  and the book value of equity.
The variable short-term debt over equity captures the evolution of short-term debt. The
variable  long-term debt over equity is the ratio between long-term liabilities  and the book
value of equity. The fourth variable,  short-term  debt over total debt, captures  the behavior
of firms' maturity structure of debt. The fifth variable,  retained earnings over total debt,
describes  the importance  of internal  financing. 8
The explanatory variables can be grouped in four different categories: (i) firm
specific characteristics,  (ii) access to international capital markets, (iii) macroeconomic
factors (namely, financial liberalization, crises, and  financial development), and (iv)
country effects. The variables in the first category focus on key characteristics  of firms.
They accomplish  two objectives  in our work. On the one hand, they allow us to analyze
how different firms' characteristics  affect firms' financing choices during the 1980s and
1990s. Therefore, we can compare our results with the existing literature, which only
focuses on the 1980s. On the other hand, these variables work as control variables in a
more general model that tests how financial liberalization and access to international
markets  affect firms' financing  choices.
Among the firm specific characteristics,  the first variable  is the logarithm  of firms'
net fixed assets, which is a proxy for the size of firms. The second variable, the ratio of
firms' net fixed assets over total assets, is an indicator of asset tangibility. The third
variable  captures  the capacity of firms to generate internal  resources  and is defined as the
8 Instead  of retained  earnings/total  debt,  the ideal  variable  to measure  retained  earnings  would  be retained
earnings/total  investment.  However,  the lack of fmns' detailed  flow statements  does not allow us to
properly  define  a ratio  between  the relevant  flows.  Then,  we choose  to measure  the magnitude  of retained
earnings  relative  to the volume  of 'external' obligations.  Note  that data  on retained  earnings  for  Mexican
firms  are not  available.
10ratio between firrms' profits after taxes over total assets. Finally, we also include a
variable  that reflects  the production  mix. This is a dummy  variable  that takes a value of one
if the firm is a producer of tradable  goods, and zero otherwise.  Tradable  producers have
the capacity  to generate  revenues  in foreign exchange;  thus, they might be able to obtain
different  kinds of financing.
The variables  in the second category  measure  the effects  of expanding  the financing
opportunitLies  through access to  international bond and equity markets. The variable
capturing access  to international  bond markets is a dummy  variable that takes a value of
one for periods in which a given firm issues bonds in international  capital markets, and
zero othervise. 9 T'he  variable  capturing  access  to international  equity  markets is defined as
the monthly average of the proportion  of equity traded in international  markets relative  to
the total value traded for that firm in each year. This variable takes a value of zero for
firms without  access  to international  equity  markets.
The third category involves macroeconomic  factois that affect firms' financing.
These factors include three variables. The first one captures financial liberalization.  This
variable is key in the paper, since it shows the effect of economic liberalization on
financial  structure.  We work with the index of fmanciatl  liberalization  created  by Kaminsky
and  Schmukler (1999). The index is  an  average of  several indicators of  financial
liberalization iin the economy. These indicators include liberalization of the domestic
financial  sector, as well as removals of restrictions o:n  foreign  borrowing and transactions
in foreign  currency.  High values of the index  reflect  high degree  of financial  liberalization.
The index,  reflects sharp liberalization  processes in the following  years for each country:
9Notice  that the variable takes a value of one only for the period in which a firm issues international  debt.
11Argentina 1991, Brazil 1990,  Mexico 1993,  Indonesia 1992,  Malaysia 1992, South Korea
1993, and Thailand 1990.1'
The second variable related to  macroeconomic factors is  the  one  capturing
financial crises. We  construct dummy variables for  the  years  1995,  1997,  1998,
corresponding  to the Mexican crisis (1995) and Asian crisis (1997 and 1998). The year
1998 also captures the Russian crisis. It has been well documented  that these crises had
strong  spillover  effects  on the economies  under study."
The last  macroeconomic variable used  is  the  degree  of  domestic financial
development.  Following  Demirguii-Kunt  and Levine (1999), we work with the sum of the
stock market capitalization  and liabilities  of the banking sector, as a percentage of GDP.
We compute  the interaction  of this variable  with the financial  liberalization  index, to study
whether fmancial liberalization affects  financially repressed economies more  than
financially developed countries. Since up to now data about the degree of domestic
financial development is  only available until  1997, the  estimations that include this
variable  are displayed  separately,  in the appendix  section.
Finally,  we include country  dummies  to control  for the nationality  of firms. This is
important  in light of the previous work on corporate  finance.  For example,  Demirgiuc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1995) find that country characteristics,  such as the efficiency of legal
institutions  and the development  of capital markets in different countries,  are important  in
explaining  differences  in firms' capital structure.
10  To check the robustness of the results, we also used a dummy variable instead of the index of financial
liberalization. The dummy variable takes the value one after the dates indicated above. The results are
qualitatively not different. Therefore, we report only one set of results.
See papers athttp://www.worldbank.orglresearch/interest/confs/past/papersfeb3-4/agenda.htr
12We run five different panel regressions for each dependent variable. The first
regression  uses pooled data for the seven emerging  economies  in the sample.  A second  and
third regressions analyze capital structure for the Asian and Latin American economies
separately.  The last two regressions  focus on the conttast between  bank-based  and market-
based economies.
The resultss  are displayed in Tables I-VI. We report results from pooled ordinary
least squares anid  within estimators (or fixed effects), with robust standard errors. In this
way, we are able to compare  our results with those frcm the existing  literature  in corporate
finance. Since within estimations  control for fim  specific effects, these models give us
intra-firm  information.  For example,  within estimates  tell how deviations  from each firm's
average net assets affect deviations  from the average debt-equity  ratio. On the other hand,
OLS estimations  combine  both inter-firm  and intra-firm  eflects. Pooled OLS estimates  do
not contain fmn slpecific  effects.  Then,  we are able tc include country  specific effects and
the variable that captures the production mix (whether firms produce tradable goods).
These variables cannot be included in the within estimations  because they are perfectly
collinear  with firn specific  effects.2
The OLS models  estimated  are:
Yi,,, =n,+  +  3X1 ,,+ y'AC±O'  +)i,
°)i,,c, - N(Oa2Jli'Ct)
such  that i  ,..,V  c =  ,.,C,  and t = 1,...,  T.
YiN,.  represents the  five variables defined above, which  measure the  firms'
financing  choices.  The sub-indexes  i, c, and t stand for finn, country,  and time respectively.
13X;,a, stands for the three variables capturing firm specific characteristics. Aj,,  denotes
access to  international financial markets. Mc,  captures the macroeconomic variables,
which only vary with time but not across firms. n,  stands for the country effect. The
variable  takes  the value one for all firms in country  c. pi,  stands  for the production  mix.
The within models  estimated  are:
Yi,c,  f,c +3'Xi,c.,  + y' Ai,, + O'M, , + £C,
E-i",t  N(O,  afzc,)
such  thatfi,c  is the firm specific effect.
The above estimations  assume exogeneity  of the explanatory  variables.  If some of
the right hand side variables were endogenously  determined,  we would need to use valid
instruments  to avoid endogeneity  biases. Given that the existing literature on corporate
finance performs the estimations  assuming exogeneity, our results are comparable to
current  results in the literature.  However,  to control  for potential biases due to endogeneity
and to check  the robustness  of the results,  we estimate  instrumental  variable  (IV)  models.
The instruments are constructed as follows. In the case of the variables with
continuous  values, we use lagged values of the same variables as instruments.  We work
with two lags, to avoid cases for which there might be first-order autocorrelation  of the
residuals. This  technique assumes that past  values of the explanatory variables are
uncorrelated  with the contemporaneous  error term. At the same time, past values of the
explanatory variables are correlated with  contemporaneous  values of the explanatory
variables.
12  Within  estimations include one dummy variable per frm.  Thus, firm specific characteristics with no
time variation and country dummies  would be a perfect linear combination  of firm  dummies.
14The dummy variables (firm specific characteristics  and country effects) are not
instrumernted,  except  the variable  capturing  access  to intermntional  bond markets.  This latter
variable might be endogenous,  since it may be easier for firms with a certain fnancial
structure to  issue foreign bonds. Past values of this dummy variable are not  suitable
instruments  because of its low correlation  with cointemporaneous  values. Therefore, we
construct a new instrument  that indicates  the degree to which capital markets are "open"f
for the country  where the firm resides.  The instrument  takes the value 1 if two conditions
are fulfilled.  First, markets are "open" for the country, in the sense that at least one firm
from that couintry  issues  bonds in international  capital  markets during that period. Second,
the firm is an "international' firm, in the sense that the firrn was able to issue international
bonds at least once before or at the period under consideration.  Otherwise, the variable
takes the value 0. This variable seems to be a valid instrument,  given that the degree of
market openness is expected  to be uncorrelated  with firm-level errors and, at the same
time, it is conrelated  with the firmn's  access  to intenational bond markets." 3
lII. Financing  Choices:  Empirical  Results
This section  presents the estimation  results, which are displayed  in Tables I-V. We
first describe  the effects of firm specific characteristics  oni  financial structure,  to compare
our results with the existing literature. These results allow us to  determine whether
including the  1990s in the sample significantly  change the relation between financial
structure  and firrm  characteristics.  Second,  we analyze  how access  to international  financial
1 Future  r  esearch  will likely  come  up with  alternative  instrunents  and further  test the robustness  of the
results,  but so far the existing  literature  has not proposed  better instruments  to deal with potential
endogeneity  biases.
15markets affects financing choices. Third, we  describe the macroeconomic effects on
financial  structure.
III.a  Firm Specific  Characteristics  and Financing  Choices
The results show that the variable size of firms-captured by the log of net fixed
assets-is  particularly  relevant in East Asia. Larger firms have a lower level of short-term
debt. This effect is relevant in the OLS, within, and IV models. Also, larger firms have a
higher level of long-term debt. This effect is significant  in the OLS and IV estimations.
Consequently,  larger firms have a longer maturity structure of debt. This result holds for
both East  Asia and Latin America  in the OLS and within estimations,  and for East Asia in
the IV equations.  Larger firms may have more access  to credit markets, especially  long-
term debt  markets  and equity  markets.  These  results are consistent  with Demirgiiu-Kunt  and
Maksimovic  (1995) and Aivazian,  Booth, Demirgiuc-Kunt,  and Maksimnovic  (1999).
The variable  related to the tangibility  of assets, net fixed assets over total assets, is
statistically  significant in the regressions for both East Asia and Latin America. Large
tangible  assets reduce debt-equity  ratios, mainly  through a reduction  in short-term  debt. As
a  consequence,  large tangible assets extend the debt maturity structure. The effect is
relevant in the OLS and IV regressions for East Asia and in the OLS, within, and IV
estimations for Latin America. This result is partially consistent with  the work by
Aivazian,  Booth, Demirgiiu-Kunt,  and Maksimovic  (1999),  who find that debt-equity  ratios
decrease  with a higher proportion  of net fixed assets.  The effect on the maturity  structure  is
also consistent  with the previous literature.  However, in Aivizian et al., the effect works
through increases  in long-term  debt.  Finally,  the finding  on tangibility  of assets supports  the
16argument by Morris (1976), according  to which finns match the maturity of assets and
liabilities.  To reduce the probability  of liquidity  problems, firms with largeT  fixed assets
need a longer  imaturity  structure.
The variable profits over total assets is statistically significant in most OLS,
within, anid  IV regressions in East Asia and Latin America. More profits are associated
with lower short-term  and long-term  debt.  Also, higher  profits are related  with shorter debt
maturity structure-suggesting that long-term debt shrinks more than short-term debt.
Additionally,  higher profits are positively correlated  with the level of internal financing
(retained earnings  over total debt). These findings agree with the existing literature.  The
results aie consistent with the pecking order hypothesis (Myers, 1984 and Myers and
Majluf, 1984).  Higher profits  shifts the financing  choices  towards  internal  financing,  so that
retained earnings finance investment projects, avoiding the market under valuation of
firms' securities.
The variable for tradable producers is statistically significant for East Asian
economies in*  some specifications. Tradable producers have lower debt-equity ratios,
particularly  Iong-term  debt. The maturity structure  of tradable  producers  is biased towards
the short--term,  relative to non-tradable  producers.  Internal financing  is more important  for
East Asian tradable producers.  These are new resulls; they have not been tested before in
the literature. Following  Diamond (199la), one can argue  that tradable producers are less
vulnerable  to domestic financial crises.4 Therefore,  they should be less concerned about
liquidity risk and they could possibly receive better future rating. Therefore, tradable
producers  might prefer  to have a shorter  maturity  structure.
17III.b Access  to International  Markets
The OLS,  within, and IV estimations  show that access  to international  bond markets
is positive and statistically  significant  in the models for long-term debt. Also, access to
international  bond markets is associated with longer debt maturity. Both effects are
relevant in  Latin America and East Asia. In  the  case of  Latin America, issues of
international  bonds are positively correlated with leverage. This implies that domestic
firms are not just Teplacing  short-term  financing  in local markets for long-term financing
abroad. In East Asia, access to international  bonds is negatively correlated with internal
financing  in the within estimations.
Capital markets in developed countries  typically have better financial institutions
and liquidity  than markets in emerging  economies.  These characteristics  simplify  activities
in the financial  intermediation  sector.  Remarkably,  the maturity  mismatch  that distinguishes
these activities can be better managed, promoting deep markets for long-term financing.
The  evidence suggests that  firms  from emerging economies benefit from accessing
international  markets,  where they can obtain  long-term  financing.
Access to international  equity markets is associated with higher leverage. This
effect is significant  in the OLS and IV regressions,  but not in the within estimations.  In
Latin America, access to international  equity markets is positively correlated  both with
short-term  and long-term debt. In East Asia, this effect only holds for short-term debt.
14 This effect is particularly relevant if one takes into account the extent of liability dollarization in
emerging  economies. See Calvo and Reinhart (1999).
15 Note that access to intemational equity markets seem  to have stronger effects in Latin American than in
East Asia. This difference might be due to the fact that Latin American companies started participating
earlier and to a much larger extent in intemational equity markets.
18Increases in the amount of equity traded abroad are not related to intra-firm financing
choices.  The above  results imply that access  to international  equity markets  may simplify
firms' access  to debt markets.  The data show that this is an inter-firm  result, suggesting  that
access  to equity  markets affects  financial  structure  by differentiating  firms. In other  words,
access  to markets  may be signaling  credit  worthiness.
Il[.c Finaincial  Liberalization  and Crises
The  different  estimations show that  financial l]iberalization  has  statistically
significant  effects on financing  choices  of firms from emerging  economies.  First, leverage
ratios decrease for all types of debt. This result holds for the regressions that jointly
consider  East Asian and Latin American  firms, and for those that only consider  East Asian
firms. Second, as economies  become more open, the maturity structure  shifts to the short
term in both East Asia and Latin America. Finally, financial liberalization  is positively
correlated  with level of internal  financing  only in East Asia.
Tlhe fall in debt-equity  ratios after financial liberalization does not support the
belief that these policies lead to overborrowing-if one focuses on debt relative to equity.
Borrowing may increase after financial liberalization,  but it does not seem to increase
relative to  equity. Consider that these estimates only cover non-financial firms and
financial  liberalization  took place in the early 1990s.  Therefore,  the arguments  made in the
papers related to recent crises do not necessarily contradict our findings. Debt-equity
ratios might haLve  increased mainly in the middle and late 1990s and mostly in financial
firms.
19The development  and growing  importance  of equity  markets  during  the 1990s  might
help explain  why we find declining  debt-equity  ratios. Financial  liberalization  in the 1990s
differs from liberalization  programs of the previous decade. Portfolio flows now play a
crucial role in international  capital markets. Moreover,  globalization  may reduce the cost
of equity capital, which in turn might help in the development  of equity markets. Stulz
(1999) explains  how globalization  reduces the cost of equity capital. First, he argues that
globalization  can reduce the discount  rate that investors  apply to cash flows generated  by
equity investment. Stulz  also  explains that  globalization could improve  corporate
governance,  making less expensive  for firms to raise funds  in capital  markets.
The existing literature on corporate finance provides arguments that explain a
shortening  debt maturity  structure after financial  liberalization. Myers (1977) shows that
when the value of firms depends on growth opportunities,  shareholders  might decide to
under invest  to avoid passing  the proceeds  of future  projects  to bondholders.  Myers claims
that, alternatively,  a  shorter debt maturity structure can avoid sub-optimal investment
decisions.  Firms from emerging  economies  typically  face new growth opportunities  when
financial  liberalization  takes place." 6 To take advantage  of these opportunities,  firms might
decide  to undertake  short-term  debt.
Existing arguments  on the international  finance side might support an alternative
explanation  for the shortening  maturity in East Asia after financial  liberalization.  On the
real side, Krugman (1994), among others, argue that these economies' growth processes
have been mainly conducted through inefficiently  allocated capital accumulation.  On the
financial side, East Asian economies have been characterized  by inadequate  prudential
20regulation of thLe  financial sector and by strong incentives  to borrow abroad, due to high
domestic funding costs. 1 7  The prospect of diminishiing  returns, after a long process of
growth  without  productivity  gains, may induce  intemational  lenders  to be cautious  in taking
long-run positions.' 8 This may increase  long-term  risk premiums  and create incentives  for
firms  to bias their  mnaturity  structure  to the short-term.
Even thought  an emerging  economy  might move to a shorter  maturity  structure,  the
financial liberal[ization  variable  can only capture  the effects of financial integration  at the
aggregate level. This variable cannot identify the effect of the actual participation in
developed financial markets on the firms' financing choices. To study this effect, we
showed in the previous section how financial  structure change  when firms issue bonds or
trade equity in international  markets. Firms with access to international  capital markets
might behave differently  than firms constrained  to finding investment  through domestic
markets.
The  financial  liberalization variable and  the  variable  capturing  access to
international  capital markets suggest that financial integration  does not seem to have a
uniform effect across firms. On the one hand, access to international  bond markets during
the 1990s  is associated  with an extended  maturity  structure  of firms  that participate  in these
markets. On the other hand, the maturity structure  shrinks for the whole economy.  These
two facts suggest that firms constrained to  local financial markets increase short-term
16 In fact, large cuLrrent  account deficits in emerging economies are usually interpreted as evidence of new
investrnents in projecits  with high-expected  returns.
17 See, for example, WVorld  Bank (1998).
18 Claessens et al. (1998) argue that relatively low profitability in some of the Asian economies forced
firms to look for external financing during the decade previous to the financial crisis, with short-term
debt playing an important role.
21borrowing  more than firms with access to international  financial  markets increase long-
term borrowing." 9
Financial  crises have a significant  effect on leverage  ratios. Long-term and short-
term debt-equity  ratios increase in all crises. 20 The effects seem to be stronger during the
Asian crisis (in 1997  and 1998)  than during the Mexican  crisis. The latter was localized in
the first quarter of 1995 and mainly involved Mexico and Argentina.  Whereas,  the Asian
Crisis had important effects on East Asian firms, with strong spillover effects on other
emerging economies. High interest rates during crisis times appear to be the main factor
behind  higher  leverage  ratios. The evidence  also indicates  that the maturity  structure shifts
to the long term. Probably,  debt contracts  with floating-rates  increase  the level of long-term
debt during crises,  while firms find it difficult  to roll over short-term  debt.
I.d Financial  Liberalization  and Domestic  Financial  Development
In the previous section  we studied  the effect of financial  liberalization  on financial
choices. However, one can  expect that countries with  varying degrees of  domestic
financial development will be  affected by  financial liberalization differently. When
emerging economies  integrate  with world capital markets, some firms can gain access to
more developed markets. Firms from countries with deep domestic financial systems
should see  few changes after opening to  world markets. Whereas, companies from
countries with  repressed  domestic  financial  markets  should  face  new  financing
opportunities  when financial  liberalization  takes place. However, if all emerging  markets
19  The behavior of  domestic fnancial  intermediation might play  an  important role on the  maturity
structure of debt in emerging  economies, altering the effects of financial liberalization  on leverage ratios.
22are much less developed than international  fnancial markets, the degree of domestic
financial  development  should  not have a significant  effect.
We test whether domestic financial developrnent  rnatters by using the indicator
constructed  by Deimirgii9-Kunt  and Levine (1999). As mentioned  before,  this indicator  is
the sum of the stock market capitalization  and lialilities of the banking sector, as a
percentage of GDP. We use the interaction of this indicator  with the index of financial
liberalization. This' interaction measures the effect of financial liberalization on firms'
financing choices, according to  the degree of domestic fmancial development. If the
development  of the domestic market is significant,  we expect this variable to have the
opposite  sign  of  the  financial liberalization variable. For  example,  if  financial
liberalization reduces debt-equity ratios, we expect the coefficient of  the interacted
variables  to have a positive sign.
The results are reported in the appendix  tables. As expected,  they show that more
developed domiestic  financial systems are less affected by liberalization processes. In
general, the interaction variable has the opposite sign of the liberalization variable. In
other worcls,  thie  negative correlation between liberalization and leverage is stronger in
less develcped  domestic  financial systems.  Also, the maturity  structure  moves to the short
term after financial liberalization to a lesser degree in countries with deeper financial
markets.
20 Note  that this effect  is not affected  by the decline  in stock market  prices.  As mentioned  before,  we
work  with  the book  value  of equity.
23IV. Bank-Based  vs. Market-Based  Systems
In this section,  we estimate  two sets of regressions.  One set contains  the countries
characterized  as bank-based  economies  (Argentina  and Indonesia).  The other set includes
the countries classified as market-based economies (Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, South
Korea, and Thailand).  The goal of these estimations  is to compare the effect of financial
liberalization  and access to international  capital markets on financial structure of firms
from bank-based  and market-based  systems.  All these  results are tabulated  in Tables VI.
If the differences between market-based  and bank-based systems are significant,
one will expect  differentiated  effects  of the integration  with international  financial  markets.
In particular,  we should see differences  in the variables  that capture access  to international
financial  markets.  These variables measure the participation  of local firms in global bond
and equity  markets.  Consequently,  these variables  necessarily  imply  a shift towards market
oriented  systems.  The regressions  help us distinguish  whether  this effect is different  across
systems.
If the difference  between  market-based  and bank-based  systems  is small,  relative  to
the  difference between emerging and  developed economies, access to  international
financial  markets  should  have similar effects  on firms from both systems.  Given that we are
working with few countries, it is hard to disentangle  any country specific effects from
system specific effects. Therefore, the results on bank-based and market-based  systems
should  be subject  to further  research  to obtain general conclusions.  The evidence  presented
here should  be considered  as a first approach  to the problem.
The variable  financial  liberalization  captures,  among other  things, the deregulation
of the  domestic financial sector. During this  process, economies move to  financial
24intermediation  based on market incentives. However, financial liberalization does not
necessarily  denote a shift towards market-based  systems (as described  in Demirgiiu-Kunt
and Levine, 1999). Financial  liberalization  can lead to the development  of a competitive
banking sector.  As a consequence,  it is less straightforward  to expect a specific difference
in this variable in the regressions  for each system.  The effect of this variable will depend
on the developments  in the aftermath  of financial  liberalizations.
The results show that firm specific characteristics  affiect  financial structure  both in
bank-based and market-based  systems. The maturity structure of debt extends as firms"
increase in size!,  both in bank-based  and market-based  systems. In market-based  systems,
both short-t;erm  debt and long-term  debt vary with size. In bank-based  systems,  just long-
term debt and debt-equity  ratios increase  with size.
Assuming  that larger firms are also the more esiablishLed  ones, one could  argue  that,
in market-based  systems, these firms issue less risky securilties.  As a consequence,  firms
are able to shift their maturity structure  to the long-term.  Larger firms increase long-term
debt and decrease short-term  debt. Moreover, larger lirms have a lower level of internal
financing.  In bank-based  systems,  one could argue  that stage financing  has a role. As firms
grow and gret  established in the market, banks do not need to spend resources to control
them periodically.  As a consequence,  long-term  debt and debt-equity  ratios are positively
associated  with firms' size.
Regarding  fte tangibility  of assets, there is no significant  difference  between-bank-
based and rmarket-based  systems on the leverage  ratios. In market-based  systems, firms
with more tangilble  assets have a longer debt maturity  structure  and higher level of internal
financing.  The effects  of profits over total assets on financial  structure  yield no differences
25between bank-based and market-based  systems. Finally, regarding firms' characteristics,
the results suggest that tradable producers bias their maturity structure  to the short-term.
There are no differences between bank-based and market-based  economies, except that
tradable  producers  have a higher  level of internal  financing  in market-based  systems.
Access  to bond markets increases  long-term  debt and extends  the maturity  structure
of debt, both in market-based and bank-based financial systems. Results do not  only
capture differences  between firms, but also within a given firm. Companies  with access  to
bond markets seem to react in the same way in bank-based  and market-based  financial
systems. In bank-based  systems, the OLS and IV estimates show that firms that access
international  bond markets also increase  their debt-equity  ratios, suggesting  that they are
not just replacing  bank debt with bonds. The results suggest  that bank-based  systems seem
to be liquidity constrained, given that firms increase their leverage as they access to
international  bond markets.  Also, within regressions  show that, in market economies,  firms
with access  reduce internal  financing.
The financial liberalization  variable is negatively associated with both short-term
and long-term  debt in market-based  economies.  However,  the maturity structure  moves to
the short  term and internal  financing  increases.
Regarding  the crisis variables,  the Mexican crisis does not have sizable effects on
capital structure, except that the maturity structure increases in market-based systems.
During the Asian crisis, market-based economies were affected first, in  1997, with
increases in most leverage ratios. During 1998, both systems were affected. Howevei,
bank-based  economies  were able to increase  the maturity structure  of debt. Most probably,
the increase in interest rates during the crisis is behind higher debt-equity  ratios. Short-
26term debt is issued or renegotiated  at higher interest  rates. Long-term  debt increases  under
floating  rates.
V. Summary  of Results  and Conclusions
There is growing literature on the effects of financial liberalization  in previously
closed economies. There is also a growing literature linking firms'  characteristics  to
financial structure. Following these two literatures, this paper analyzed cross-country
microeconomic  data on financing choices during the process of integration with global
financial markets. To our knowledge, this type of evidence has not been previously
examined.
The paper investigated  whether  financial  integration  affects  the financing  choices  of
non-financial  firms in emerging economies  from East Asia and Latin America. Using a
firm-level panel, we studied the behavior of firms' financing choices when economies
become liberalized and when firms access international  bond and equity markets. We
focused oni  leverage levels, debt maturity, and the choice between external and intemal
financing  to study financial  structure.
The results from this paper can be summarized  as follows.
*  Firm  specific  characteristics  and  financing  choices:  Although we
extended the sample to include the 1990s, our results are consistent  with the previous
literature,  wvhich  m[ostly  covers the 1980s.  In other  words, larger firms and firms with more
tangible  assets extend  their debt maturity.  Higher proilts are associated  with more internal
financing,  less leverage,  and shorter  debt maturity.  We also extended  the existing  literature
by analyzing  the effects  of the production  mix on financial  structure.  The evidence  suggests
27that frmns  producing  tradable  goods in East Asia have shorter maturity  and higher internal
financing.
*  Access to international bond markets: The data suggest that firms with
access to  international markets increase their long-term debt and lengthen their debt
maturity structure. Also, access to international  bond markets is negatively related to
internal financing in East Asia, while it is positively correlated with leverage in Latin
America.
*  Access to international eauitv markets: When more equity is traded in
international  markets, firms increase short-term  debt. In Latin America, the shift to global
markets  is positively  associated  with long-term  debt and a longer  maturity  structure.
- Financial liberalization:  The evidence shows that financial liberalization
is positively correlated with internal financing and negatively related to both short-term
and long-term  debt-equity  ratios,  particularly  in East Asia. The evidence  also suggests  that
financial liberalization  is associated with a shorter debt maturity structure,  both in East
Asia and Latin America.
a  Financial crises: Leverage ratios tend to  increase during crisis times.
Given that issues of international  bonds decreased and there probably was a reduction of
domestic  debt issues during crisis years, higher interest rates are likely behind  the increase
in debt-equity  ratios. The evidence also shows cross-regional  spillover effects. Leverage
increased  in East Asia during the Mexican crisis and in Latin America during the Asian
crisis. Finally, the maturity structure extends during crisis times, what may be due to
floating  rates in long-term  debt and non-renewal  of short-term  debt contracts.
28*  Financial integration and domestic  financial development:  The evidence
suggests  that fiims in emerging  economies  with more developed  domestic  financial  systems
are less affected  by financial  liberalization.
*  Bank-based vs. market-based  systems: Assuming  that the countries  in our
sample represent bank-based  and market-based  economies accurately,  the results suggest
that integration  with international  capital  markets affect all emerging  economies  similarly.
In other words, the difference  between emerging  and (leveloped  markets seems to be more
important  than the difference  between bank-based  and market-based  emerging economies.
Access to international  bond markets increases  maturity  in both types of systems.  The data
also show that access to  bond markets increases leverage in  bank-based economies,
suggesting  that their  domestic  financial  sector  might be liquidity  constrained.
*  ease  study of Argentina: Consistent with the general evidence, larger
Argentine  firms extend  their debt maturity.  In contrast  to other emerging  economies,  larger
firms also increase short-term debt. As in other coultries, more profitable firms reduce
leverage and increase internal financing, while more tangible assets are associated with
less leverage.  Access to international  bond markets extends  debt maturity,  while access to
international equity markets has the  opposite effect. Consistent with the East Asian
experience,  financial liberalization  reduces debt-equity  ratios and shortens debt maturity.
In contrast to other emerging economies,  the Mexican crisis reduces the debt maturity
structure.  Finally,  vve  found a strong  relationship  between debt currency  denomination  and
maturity.  To extend  the maturity  structure,  firms contract  foreign  currency  debt.
29In sum, our main results show that globalization  of financial  markets are related to
firms' financing choices. Globalization  seems to have uneven effects. On the one hand,
domestic firms that actually participate in international  markets obtain better financing
opportunities.  For example,  these firms are able to extend  their liability maturity  structure.
On the other hand, debt maturity tends to shorten when countries undertake financial
liberalization.  This implies that firms that do not participate in international  markets are
likely increasing  their short-term  financing  liabilities.
The  evidence from this  paper suggests some  policy lessons related to  the
development  and regulation  of domestic  financial  markets.  First,  the results suggest  that the
domestic financial  sector plays an important  role. This sector needs to provide adequate
financing  to firms unable to obtain  foreign  funding.  As a consequence,  policies  that help to
consolidate  a mature domestic financial  system indirectly favor the development  of local
firms, through  the provision of financing  alternatives.  This implication  is confirmed  by the
fact that countries with deeper domestic financial markets are less affected by financial
liberalization  policies.
A second policy lesson is related to  the prudential regulation of the domestic
financial sector. Although  previous studies suggest that financial liberalization  may drive
the economy to overborrowing,  the results show that debt-equity  ratios do not tend to
increase after financial  liberalization.  However,  the data also show that there is a shift of
the maturity  structure  to the short term. Some authors argue that the maturity  structure  of
debt played  a  crucial role  in  recent  crises.  Therefore, it  may  be  important that
liberalization  policies be accompanied by strong prudential regulation in the financial
sector,  to prevent a mismatch  between  the maturity  of assets and liabilities.
30This paper jpresented  a first step to understanding  the effects of financial  integration
on financing  choices.  However,  this paper opened  new questions  for future research.  First,
we showed  that finns with access  to international  financial  markets expand  their financing
opportunities.  It would be worthwhile  to explicitly  test what happens to firms confined  to
domestic financial markets, when large firms migrate to  global markets. Are there
"crowding in"  effects? Do firms that obtain external financing expand the  financing
opportunities  fcir  finms  that rely on domestic  markets" Second, it would be interesting  to
investigate  how the financing  choices  of the public sector affect  the financing  opportunities
of firms  with arkd  without access  to international  capital  markets.  Third, it seems imnportant
to understand  whalt  determines  access to international  financial markets.  Fourth, it would
be worth studying  the effects  of globalization  on firms' growth,  investment  decisions,  and
value.  These interesting  questions  were beyond  the scope of the present  paper, but this type
of data set would allow  us to pursue further  research  in this dlirection.
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34Appendix  1: T'he  Case  of Argentina
This appen,dix  studies in detail  the case of Argentinia  This case is worth studying
due to a  numlber  of reasons. First, Argentina underwent a  sharp process of financial
liberalization  during the early 1990s.  Second,  Argentina is under a currency  board system
since 1991, with assets and liabilities legally held both in peso and U.S. dollars. Dollar
liabilities  irepresent  a very large proportion of total liabilities,  implying a high degree of
dollarization.  Third, some Argentine  firmns  became  rapidly integrated  with world financial
markets. Fourth, Argentina suffered the spillover effects of the Mexican, Asian, and
Russian crises. Fifth, the Argentine financial system consolidated  during the mid-1990s
with a  strong participation of foreign banks. Sixth, microeconomic  data on Argentine
corporatioins  was not studied  before in the literature. 'Seventh,  unlike the other countries  in
our sample,  there is information  on debt currency  denomination  of Argentine  firms.
To study Argentina,  we follow  the same  methodology  used for the rest of the paper.
The results,  for Argentina  are presented  in the appendix  tables.  They can  be summarized  as
follows.
Firm Specific Characteristics  and Financial structure:
The evidence  suggests  that larger firms increase  their leverage.  This contrasts  with
the East Asian experience,  which suggests  that larger firmis  increase long-term debt and
reduce short-term  financing.  The data also show that within a given firm, changes in size
are positively correlated with increases in short-term financing. Both in East Asia and
Latin America, the data suggest that increases in firms' assets reduce short-term debt.
Finally, larger finns extend the maturity structure of their liabilities. The experience of
35Argentina is  consistent with  emerging economies in  general and  with the  previous
literature.  Larger firms  have better access  to credit markets,  particularly  to long-term  debt.
Firns  with a large proportion of net fixed assets reduce leverage by decreasing
both short-term and long-term debt. This effect is not significant  within firms. In this
regard,  the behavior  of firms in Argentina  is more similar  to the one of East  Asian firms.  In
other  Latin American  countries,  firms  with a higher proportion  of fixed  assets reduce short-
term debt. They do not reduce long-term  financing.  The effects  on maturity  structure  is not
clear, so it is hard to argue  if firms in Argentina  match the maturity  of assets and liabilities
Higher profits reduce leverage in Argentina. The relationship  holds both within
firms and between firms. More profitable  firms increase internal financing.  These results
are compatible  with the experience  in other  emerging  economies.
The results  of  currency debt denomination are very  interesting. 2'  The most
important  result is that a higher proportion of peso denominated  debt is associated  with a
shorter debt  maturity structure.  This result is statistically  significant  in the OLS, within and
IV regressions.  The findings are consistent  with the fact that the Argentine economy  has
undergone  through a long and extreme  inflationary  process  during the 1980s,  which lead to
a phenomenon  dubbed "cortoplacismo."  This is associated  to situations in which markets
for long-term,  domestic-currency  contracts  tend to become thin and, in some cases, even
21 Note  that  since  data for  debt  currency  denomination  restricts  the sample  significantly,  we only  included
this  variable  in  the regression  that  we expected  a meaningful  effect.
36disappear. 22 The data suggest that allowing agents  to legally hold assets and liabilities  in
U.S. dollars  has lengthened  the maturity  structure  of debt  in Argentine  firms. 23
Access to Inte,rnational  Markets:
There is some evidence  that access to international  bond markets increases long-
term financing,  extending  the maturity  structure  of debt.  This,  is consistent  with the evidence
for other  emerging  economies.
The financial sector consolidation  and financial liberalization in Argentina took
place through a strong participation  of foreign  banks. The latter replaced, in many cases,
domestic financial intermediaries. These new international banks have probably not
provided credit under conditions similar to  the ones offered by  international capital
markets. Therefore, firms still benefit from accessilg foreign bond markets. The data
suggest that letting international  financial agents  to cperate in domestic markets does not
seem to be equivalent  to letting  firms access  international  capital  markets directly.
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
As in East Asia, financial  liberalization  seems to reduce leverage  in general.  In the
Argentine  case, there is some evidence  that both short-term  and long-term debt decrease.
The maturity  structure  shifts  towards  the short-term  in Argentina.  This is consistent  with the
experience  of other  emerging  economies.  The MexicaL  crisis shortens  the maturity  structure
of debt in Argentina,  in contrast  with the experience  ol other  Latin American  countries.
22 See, for emnple,  Eleymann  and Leijonhufvud (1995)  and Neumeyer (1998).
23  Note thal; the basic results do not contain the variable on currency debt denomination. A reduced
number of finns provide data for this variable. Therefore,  we only include the currency  debt denomination
as additional results.
37Appendix  2: Number  of Firms  and Periods  Available  for Each Country
Country  Period  Number  of Firms
Argentina  1988-1999  73
Brazil  1985-1998  264
Indonesia  1989-1998  185
Malaysia  1983-1998  561
Mexico  1981-1998  202
South Korea  1980-1998  410
Thailand  1980-1999  278
38Appendix  3: ILiterature  Review
Corporate Finance:
There is a vast literature  in corporate  finance that focuses  on the financial  structure
of firms. The seminal  article  by Modigliani  and Miller  (1958)  shows that the value of firms
is independent  to its financial structure.  This implies a complete dichotomization  of real
and financial deciisions.  The assumptions  made by NModigliani  and Miller induced a large
amount of work to  understand the characteristics  of  firms'  financing choices. Three
fundamental  decisions  determine  financing  choices: (  a) internal  vs. external  financing,  (b)
debt  vs. equity  financing,  and (c) short-term  vs. long-term  debt (maturity  structure  of debt).
Most explanations  for the capital  structure  of firms  have focused on agency  costs of
financing. 24 They emphasize  the potential conflict of interest between investors holding
different  types of securities.  Within agency  costs, we can distinguish  two approaches  to the
problem.  One emphasizes  managerial  issues and the other asymmetric  information.  Both
approaches  suggest that certain firm characteristics  are important  in order to understand
financial  structure.
The  managerial approach concentrates on the  conflicting objectives that  the
separation between ownership and management may  create within the  firm. 25 This
separation  may induce  discretionary  behavior  on the part of managers,  which is difficult  to
control by  shareholders/owners.  Professional marLagers  may  want to  avoid external
financing,  which would  subject  them to the discipline  of capital  markets.  An important  firm
24 We  do not intend  to offer  here an exhaustive  exposition  oF  the different  theories  on financing  choices
of firms.  We  just want  to  provide  a general  description  of the ideas  that  motivated  our  work.
25 See,  for  example,  Jensen  and  Meckling  1977.
39characteristic  related  to managerial  considerations  is a measure  of profits, given that it may
account  for the firm's ability  to generate  capital  internally.
The asymmetric  information  approach  focuses  on two different  conflicts  of interest:
(i) between inside and outside investors and (ii) between bondholders and equityholders.
Within the first class of conflict,  the work by Myers and Majluf (1984) shows that equity
may be under-priced,  when outsiders are uninformed relative to insiders. Myers (1984)
refers to this as the 'pecking order' theory of financing. Namely, firms intend first to
finance investment  internally.  Then, they move to low risk debt and, as a last resort, to
equity.  Here, again,  a measure  of profit  would be a relevant  firm characteristic.
The  work  by  Diamond  (199la,  1991b)  also  focuses  on  insider/outsider
relationships  in his study  of the determinants  of debt maturity.  Diamond  stresses  a trade-off
between  firms' good ratings (which may bias them towards the short-term)  and liquidity
risk (creating  incentives  to contract  long-term  debt).
Regarding the  conflict between bondholders and  equityholders, Hart  (1993)
emphasizes  that as leverage  increases,  equityholders  have incentives  to siphon funds from
the firm.  They will appropriate  all these funds,  while the consequent  reduction  in the value
of the firms will be shared with the bondholders.  One key firm characteristic  related  to this
problem is its asset structure.  A greater proportion  of specific capital assets (fixed assets)
can potentially  reduce  bondholders'  risk (and encourage  debt  financing),  due to the fact that
it allows firms to issue secure  debt.
The asset structure  can also affect debt maturity,  though for reasons not related tc,
agency  problems.  Morris (1976) suggests  that firms intend to match the maturity of assets.
and liabilities.  A debt maturity shorter than asset life increases the risk of being illiquid
40when payments come due. On the other hand, a debt maturity  longer than asset life may
create problems of finding new assets to support debt service. 26 Finally, another firm
characteristic nol  suggested in  the literature on  agency cost  is  size. As  argued by
Demirgiig-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1994),  firm size mrray  be relevant  for financial  structure,
because  access  to financial  markets  may be a functior.  of size.
The emnpirical  literature on financial  structure in developing  countries emphasizes
the  influence of  firms'  characteristics,  institutional factors, and  the development of
financial markets  on the financing  choices  of firms.  Aivazian, Booth, Demirgiiu-Kunt,  and
Maksimovic  (19599)  use a firm-level  database  to study whether  the capital structure  theory
is relevant  for developing  countries  with different  institutional  characteristics. 2" They study
capital structure in ten developing countries and fccus on three main issues. First, they
study the possibility that corporate leverage decisions differ between developed and
developintg courntries. Second, they  analyze the  factors that  affect  cross-sectional
variability  within each country.  Finally, they examine  the possibility  that capital structure
models  add insights  to just knowing  the nationality  of the company.  They focus on book and
market debt ratios.2 8 They regress these ratios against: (a) firms characteristics  (tax rates,
assets tangibility, business risk, size, returns on assets, and market to book ratios), (b)
dummy  variables for the different countries,  and (c) aggregate  financial  indicators  for each
country  (for cross country  regressions).
26 See also Capiio and Demirgiuc-Kunt  (1997).
27  There  exist sonae case  studies.  Jaramillo and  Schiani:arelli (1996) study the  case  of  Ecuador,
Schiantarelli  and Srivastava  (1996) and Samuel  (1996) cover the case of India, while Gallego and Loayza
(2000) analyze the case of Chile.
2B They focus on three different ratios: (1) the total book debt ratio, defined as total liabilities divided by
total liabilities plus net worth, (2) the long book debt ratios, defined as long-term liabilities divided by
long-term liabilities plus net worth, and (3) the long market debt ratio, by substituting  the average equity
market  value for net worth.
41The  finding by  Aivazian, Booth,  Demirgiuc-Kunt,  and  Maksimovic can  be
summarized  in three basic points. First, financial structure in developing and developed
countries is affected by the same factors. The only difference  is that firms in developing
countries  have less long-term  debt in relation  to their counterparts  in developed  countries.
Second,  profitability  reduces  total debt ratios. Tangibility  of assets also reduces  total debt,
but increases  long-term debt ratios. Size also affects debt ratios, though differently  across
countries.  Third,  country  factors  are at least as significant  as financial  factors  to understand
financial  structure.
Demirgiuq-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998a  and 1998b)  examine  debt  maturity  in thirty
countries during the period 1980-1991.  Their sample includes developed and developing
countries.  These papers present cross-country  studies and focus on the effects of legal and
financial institutions  on firm's funding decisions.  They analyze short-term  and long-term
debt and the maturity structure of liabilities.  Their main findings can be summarized  as
follows. First, they show that both an active stock market and a well-developed  legal
system facilitate growth of  firms and  access to  external funding. Second, firms in
developed  countries  have more long-term  debt and a greater proportion  of their total debt
is held as long-term debt.  Third,  large firms in countries  with more effective  legal systems
have more long-term debt, relative to assets. Their debt is of longer maturity. Fourth, in
countries with active stock markets, large firms have more long-term debt and debt of
longer  maturity.  In countries  with a large banking  sector,  there is some evidence  that small
firms have less short-term debt and their debt is of longer maturity. Fifth, high ratios of
fixed assets  to total assets are positively  related  to long-term  debt.
42Financia! Structure:
The literature  on financial  structure  discusses  the characteristics  of bank-based  vis-
a-vis market-based  economic  systems.  In bank-based  systems, banks provide most of the
credit to the economy.  In market-based  systems,  firms raise funds in capital markets  (bond
and equity  markets).
When comparing  bank-based  and market-based  systems, a key issue is related to
the trade off betwAeen  liquidity of financial instrutrLents  and control of debtors. Highly
liquid security markets reduce incentives  for traders to control the behavior of managers.
Bhide (1993) argues that corporate bonds, which usually do not contain provisions for
inside monitoring, can  be  freely  traded  in  liquid  mrkarkets.  This  liquidity  allows
bondholders  to 'penalize' bad management.  Whereas, unsecured business loans require
banks  to control  t;he  activities  and management  of borToweis,  implying  the costly collection
of inside information.  This process  prevents  the liquid trading  of bank loans. However,  one
potential advantage of inside monitoring is the development of long-term relationships
between borrowers  and lenders. This could extend the maturity structure of liabilities in
relation  to market-based  economies.
Slage financing gives a different perspective  to the expected  maturity structure of
debt contracts  under bank-based  and market-based  systems.  For example,  stage financing
might replace long-term  loans for a series of short-term  contracts in bank-based  systems.
Stulz (1998) points out that banks are prepared  to effectively  renew and expand loans, as
borrowers  offer convincing  information  about  the viability of their projects.  Moreover,  if a
borrower  pays her debts, there is no reason to spend resources  trying to figure out the true
value of the borrower's assets. In this way, Stulz suggests  that stage financing  is often an
43efficient solution to the intermediation  problem. Thus, this sort of financing agreements
implies that there is no simple relationship  between financial structure and maturity of
financial  instruments.
International  Finance:
The literature on international  finance  provides another  perspective  to the financial
structure of firms. This literature emphasizes  the consequences  of financial liberalization
policies on financing choices. For example,  McKinnon and Pill (1997) argue that in the
transition from economic  repression  to liberalization  many countries engage in excessive
foreign  borrowing  that ultimately  proves to be unsustainable.  This is due to the interaction
between private expectations  and domestic  economic  policy. On the one hand, the private
sector could miscalculate  the eventual  payoffs that a credible  reform will bring about. On
the other, the existence of deposit insurance leads banks to lend aggressively,  giving a
falsely optimistic  signal to non-bank  firms and households.  McKinnon  and Pill argue that
the appropriateness  of prudential  banking  regulation  in times of structural  change might be
hard to assess, so that the effects of moral hazard problems could be  crucial in these
economies.
On the empirical side, Kaminsky  and Reinhart (1999) focus on the links between
financial and balance of payments crises. They examine these episodes for a number of
industrial and developing countries during the 1970's, 1980's, and 1990's. Remarkably,
they find that in 18 out of the 25 banking  crises they analyze,  the financial  sector  had been
liberalized  at most during the previous five years. Moreover, econometric  analysis shows
that financial liberalization helps to  predict banking crises. As  McKinnon and Pill,
44Kaminsky and Reinhart suggest that, in many instances,  liberalization  policies take place
without  an adequate  regulatory  and supervisory  framewvork.
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* Ratios are averages  across fiumsTable  1:  Panel Estirmites  focr  Debt-Equity Ratios
Dependent Variable: Total  DebtiEquity
Independent  Pool  Latin Amarica  and  East Asia  Pool Latirn  America  Pool East  Asia
Variables:  O.S  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV
omoSf  NCehtaFiaxed  Assts  0.045  0.051  0.001  0.035  -0.039  -0.077  0.077'  -0.077  0.072
(1.026)  (-0.955)  (0.022)  (0.725)  '-0.893)  (-0.984)  (1.981)  (-1.024)  (1.101)
Net  Fixed  Assets/Total  -1.100'-  -0.010  -1.717--  -0.749'  -0.635  -0.753--  -1.475'  -0.397  -1.999'-
Assets  (-4.755)  (-0.033)  (-6.553)  (-3.444)  '-1.618)  (-2.241)  (-9.289)  (.1.379)  (-7.437)
Profits/Total  Assets  4-.174-  -7.593"  -16.162-'  -2.702...  -' .955''  -7.921'.  -9.069"'  -6.847-'  -19.802-'
(-3.615)  (-2.648)  (-4.843)  (-8.387)  '-5.451)  (-4.522)  (-7.134)  (-3.814)  (-3.986)
Tradable  Producers  -0.1137  0.132  -0.182  -0.277  -0.473'.  -0.113
(-0.660)  (0.405)  (-1.516)  (-1.532)  (-3.899)  (-0.473)
Access:
Access  to lntl Bond  0.384"-  0.063  1.396"  0.197-  0.089  1.056"  0.125  0.136  -0.554
Markets  (2.512)  (0.444)  (2.350)  (1.992)  (1.580)  (3.524)  (0.798)  (1.064)  (-1.357)
Access  to Intl Equity  0.000  0.000  0.00°°  0.719"  0.143  0.875  0.000  0.000  0.000'
Markets  (1.424)  (1.018)  (1.664)  (3.082)  (0.827)  (1.160)  (1.437)  (0.969)  (1.763)
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  0.884"  - 0.499'  0.627  -0.349  0.295  -0.249  -0.847-'  40.752''  40.444
(-2.263)  (-1.961)  (-1.489)  (-0.972)  (0.820)  (-0.438)  (-3.797)  (-3.090)  (-1.466)
Mexican  Crisis  -1995  -0.238  40.071  0.497  0.088  0.127-  0.133  0.089  0.119"  0.016
(-0.911)  (-0.558)  (-1.097)  (1.305)  (2.166)  (1.245)  (1.205)  (2.066)  (0.122)
Asian  Crisis-  1997  1.193"  1.176-  0.880  0.300'  0.261"  0.351'  0.744"  0.901-"  0.678"'
(2.9119)  (2.033)  (1.585)  (1.881)  (1.994)  (1.928)  (4.152)  (5.138)  (3.190)
Asian  Crisis  -1998  1.133:  1.293"  0.728  0.299-  ).234"  0.466-"  0.697  0.815-  0.096
(2.4110)  (3.281)  (1.470)  (2.426)  (2.614)  (2.642)  (1.544)  (1.870)  (0.368)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  -1.627-'  -2.118-'  -0.080  -0.837
(-3.074)  (-2.990)  (-0.194)  (-1.265)
Brazil  -1.670-'  -2.209"'  -0.183  -1.011'
(-2.993)  (-2.839)  (-0.678)  (-2.239)
Indonesia  -0.64S-  -0.410  -0.179  0.233
(-2.045)  (40.636)  (-1.234)  (0.729)
South  Korea  0.609  0.070  0.981--  0.683-
(1.4'14)  (0.098)  (4.118)  (2.230)
Malaysia  -1.280-3  -1.643"'  -0.7386  .0.539"
(-2.892)  (-2.602)  (-3.912)  (-2.012)
Mexico  1.455'--  .1.631''
(-3.509)  (-2.203)
c  4.174-'  5.088'  1.865"  3.397"  4.153-  3.863''
(10.8'77)  (7.761)  (7.118)  (6.655)  (7.957)  (5.670)
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.C40  0.157  0.030  0.072  0.478  0.051  0.251  0.497  0.201
Fixed  Effects  2.065''  6.824'  4.823"'
Chi-Hausman  0.095  1.291  14.661--
NumberofFirms  7'99  799  799  238  238  238  527  527  527
Number  of Observations  6137  6137  4442  1785  1785  1253  4074  4074  3003
RobUst  standard  e9M7  7W =c`h n  7etenrskedastiiy. Thalland  is the base  country.  fstaaitMcs  are  in  paren;  ;
- indicate  10,5,1,  percentt  level  ot sigtiicance,  respectively.
Instrurnental  vanable  eshmalion  (Iv): Instrments  are  lagged  explanatoryvardabes  ot Finms  Characteristics  (excep.:  the  variable  Tradable  Producers),  lagged  values  ot the  variable  Access
to Infl Equity  Markets,  and  arn  indicator  ot each  country's  access  to international  bond  marlets.Table II: Panel  Estimates  for Short Term Debt
Dependent  Variable:  Short-Term  DebtlEquity
Independent  Pool Latin America  and  East  Asia  Pool Latin America  Pool East Asia
Variables:  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firms'  Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets  -0.064'  -0.066  -0.121"  4.0012  -0.029"  -0.092-'  -0.065-  -0.096  -0.084
(-1.695)  (-1.437)  (-2.254)  (-0.860)  (-2.196)  (-3.679)  (-2.267)  (-1.703)  1-1.528)
Net Fixed Assets/Total  -0.951''  0.034  -1.363-'  -0.744"'  -0.408'  40.788"'  -1.235"  -0.324  -1.462''
Assets  (-4.682)  (0.133)  (-6.611)  (-4.362)  (-1.807)  (-5.571)  (-10.975)  (-1.600)  1-7.127)
Profts/Total  Assets  -6.427.'.  -6.187"  -1 2.697-'  -1.397"  -0.967"'  -4.1 50'  -6.142-  -4.778'  -14.322'
(-3.016)  (-2.279)  (-4.024)  (-7.517)  (-5.034)  (-5.650)  (-5.801)  (-3.237)  1-3.269)
Tradable Producers  0.106  0.388  40.107  .0.090  -0.176'  0.132
(0.460)  (1.282)  (.1.419)  (.0.977)  (-1.975)  (0.674)
Access:
Acress to lnt'l  Bond  0.061  -0.137  0.808  0.043  -0.053  0.611"  -0.131  -0.092  -D.740'
Markets  (0.617)  (-1.133)  (1.471)  (0.850)  (-1.410)  (3.248)  (-1.391)  (-1.111)  (-2.422)
Access to Intl  Equity0  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.287'  0.049  OA97  0.000'  0.000  0.000'
Markets  (1.724)  (1.134)  (1.567)  (1.704)  (0.543)  (1.029)  (1.942)  (1.061)  (2.038)
Financial  Liberalization  and  Crises:
Financial Liberalization  -0.156  40.361'  -0.136  -0.020  0.172'  0.040  -0.443'  -0.530"  -0.140
(-0.626)  (-1.964)  (-0.382)  (-0.236)  (1.896)  (0.291)  (-2.792)  (-2.858)  (-0.613)
Mexican Crisis -1995  -0.248  -0.106  -0.448  0.067  0.068'  0.135'  0.045  0.056  -0.017
(-1.083)  (-0.902)  (-1.043)  (1.366)  (1.734)  (2.048)  (0.818)  (1.522)  (-0.171)
Asian Crisis -1997  0.729'  0.656  0.468  0.122  0.127'  0.136  0.388"  0.4558  0.325"
(2.012)  (1.216)  (0.903)  (1.572)  (2.418)  (1.591)  (3.778)  (4.897)  (2.466)
Asian Crisis  -1998  0.659'  0.856"'  0.458  0.132  0.088'  0.241-  0.133  0.194  -0.085
(1.733)  (2.673)  (0.972)  (1.498)  (1.653)  (2.090)  (0.841)  (1.352)  (-0.430)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  -1.419-'  -1.875.'  -0.140  40.693'
(-2.829)  (-2.783)  (-1.250)  (-3.521)
Brazil  -1.412'  -1.960''  40.091  -0.683"
(-2.684)  (-2.661)  (-0.923)  (-4.022)
Indonesia  -0.366  *0.172  0.105  0.515'
(-1.250)  (-0.282)  (1.060)  (1.791)
South Korea  0.448  0.028  0.824'  0.639-'
(1.168)  (0.043)  (5.132)  [2.866)
Malaysia  -1.090"'  -1.512"  -0.7866  0.695-
(-2.632)  (-2.564)  (-5.686)  ( 3.315)
Mexico  -0.881"  .0.970
(-2.425)  (-1.430)
c  3.147"'  4.100'  1.238-'  2.273''  3.593-'  3.428"
(10.916)  (7.668)  (9.000)  (8.900)  (8.968)  !6.447)
Adjusted RF-quared  0.022  0.133  0.01  0.178  .bb6/  0.135  0.186  0.437  T
Fixed Effects  1.980"'  7.431"  4.467"
Chi-Hausman  0.250  4.031  321'
Number of  Firms  799  799  799  238  238  238  526  526  526
NumberofObservations  6137  . 6137  4442  1785  1785  1253  4116  4116  3033
Robust  standard  errors-White  correcton  ior heteroskedaslicity.  Thailand  is the base  oountry.  T-stafistics  are  in  parenthesis.
-,11,-1  indicate  10,5,1,  percerd  level  of significance,  respectively.
I-stnrmertal  variable  estinalion  (9v):  Instrunents  ae lagged  explanatory  vanables  ot Rmms  Characteristics  (except  the  vanrabe  Tnadabe  Produces),  lagged  values  of the  variade  Acoess
to Intl Equity  Markets.  and an  indicator  of  each  country's  access  to irtemational  bond  marRets.Table III: Panel Estimates  for  Long-Term  Debt
Dependent Variable.:  Lang-Term  Debt/Equlty
Independent  ______  Pool Latin  America  and  East Asia  Pool  Latin  mica  Pool East  Asia
Variables:  - d  g  Within  IV  OLS  Vtithin  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firms' Characteristics:
Log  of Net  Fixed  Assets  0.1109'  0.015  0.123"'  0.047  -D.009  0.015  0.145"-  0.014  0.169"^
(6.549)  (0.789)  (5.581)  (1.217)  (-(1.284)  (0.247)  (7.587)  (0.376)  (7.125)
Net  Fixed  Assets/Total  -0.149"  -0.044  -0.354"'  -0.444  *0.227  0.015  -0.236''  -0.064  -0.556'..
Assets  (-:2.097)  (-0.433)  (-2.933)  (-0.039)  (-' .171)  (0.062)  (-2.860)  (-0.488)  (4.231)
Profts/Total  Assets  -1.747"'  -1.406"  -3.465''  -1.305"'  -0.988"'  -3.771"'  -2.762"'  -1.939'''  -4.479''
(-'.784)  (-5.056)  (-7.017)  (-6.279)  ( ;.236)  (-3.769)  (-8.003)  (-3.167)  (-6.327)
Tradable  Producers  -0.273"-'  4.256'  -0.075  -0.187  -0.324'-  -0.311"'
(-4.228)  (-3.484)  (4.865)  (-1.411)  (-4.510)  (-3.447)
Access:
Access  to Int'l  Bond  0.323'  0.200-'  0.589'  0.153'  0.-143''  0.445'  0.249-  0.233"'  0.139
Markets  (4.127)  (4.179)  (4.049)  (2.090)  ('1.538)  (2.538)  (2.774)  (3-334)  (0.683)
Access  to Int'l  Equty  0.00G  0.000  0.000  0.432'  0.094  0.377  0.000  0.000  0.000
Markets  ((.990'  (0.800)  (1.635)  (2.464)  (0.872)  (0.840)  (0.691)  (0.817)  (1.190)
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  4.528"'  4.138  4.491'"  0.329  0.123  4.290  4.401"  -0.199'  4.337"'
(-4.116)  (-1.010)  (-2.943)  (-1.126)  (t).432)  (-0.628)  (-3.832)  (-1.710)  (-2.703)
Mexican  Crisis  -1995  0.01  0  0.034  4.048  0.021  0.059'  -0.002  0.054  0.070'  0.038
(0.3561  (1.289)  (-1.270)  (0.502)  (1.667)  (-0.034)  (1.562)  (2.070)  (0.620)
Asian  Crisis  -1997  0.464-  0.520-'  0.412'  0.178  0.134  0.215  0.378"'  0.464-*  0.390-'
(4.559)  (5.524)  (4.023)  (1.448)  (1.236)  (1.540)  (3.534)  (4.367)  (3.341)
Asian  Crisis  -1998  0.474"'  0.437'  0.270'  0.167'  0.146'  0.225'  0.616'  0.652"  0.284-
(:2.7265  (2.769)  (3.415)  (2.812)  (.2.699)  (2.773)  (1.803)  (2.014)  (2.242)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  40.208-'  4.243"'  0.060  -0.143
(-3.616:1  (-3.442)  (0.186)  (-0.277)
Brazil  -0.258-'  4.259"  40.092  -0.327
(-3.449)  (-2.336)  (-0.449)  (-0.984)
Indonesia  -0.283"''  4.238''  -0.269'''  -0.278''
(-4.100)  (-2.728)  (-3.572)  (-3.188)
South  Korea  0.161  0.042  0.170  0.044
(1.243)  (0.257)  (1.379)  (0.315)
Malaysia  -0.190"'  -0.130  0.078  0.201'
(-2.561)  (-1.225)  (0.846)  (1.870)
Mexico  -0.574"'  4.661"'
(-4.135)  (-3.716)
C  1.027'-  0.988'"  0.627-'  1.124"'  0.537"  0.399
(5.184)  (3.563)  (3.109)  (3.232)  (2.188)  (1.356)
Adjusted  K-SquaFed  UI:T  t)  0.404  0.165  0.043  1.25  0.023  0.210  0.43Z  0.218
Fixed  Effects  4.12'  5.926-'  4.104'
Chi-Hausman  474.090"'  3.380  8.598
Number  of Firms  7959  799  799  238  238  238  525  525  525
NumberofObservations  6137  6137  4442  1785  1785  1253  4018  4018  2971
Robust  standard  erors-Whlte  cerrection  fx hreteroskedastcity.  Thailand  Is  the  base  counry.  T-statiics  are  in parnahasis.
':---'-indicate  10,5,1.  percent  IEvel  of snigniicanae,  respectively.
Instrumenla  variable  estimaticn  tV):  Instruments;  are  lagged  explnatory  variables  of  Firms'  Chaacteristics  (except  tihn  variable  Tradable  Poducers),  lagged  values  of  the  variable  Access
to  bntl  Equity  Markets,  and  an  indicator  of  each  countrys  access  to international  bond  markets.Table IV: Panel  Estimates  for Maturity  Structure
Dependent Variable:  Short-Term Debt/Total Debt
Independent  Pool Latin America  and  East Asia  Pool Latin America  Pool East  Asia
Variables:  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firms' Characteristics:
Log  of Net  Fixed  Assets  -0.042-'  0.020...  .037-'  -0.032-  .. 0015  -0.012  -0.051--  -0.036V^  -4044-'
(-15.736)  (-6.762)  (-8.525)  (-6.491)  (-3.246)  (-1.198)  (-14.340)  (-6.297)  (-9.800)
Net Fixed  Assets/Total  -0.158-  -0.078-  -0.180'-  -0.231-  -0.097  -0.340-  -0.136-  -0.021  -0.149--
Assets  (-9.362)  (-3.294)  (-7.887)  (-4.088)  (-1.906)  (-6.476)  (-7.522)  (-0.707)  (-5.688)
ProfitslTotal  Assets  0.187-  0.180-'  0.222'  0.131-  0.207  0.177  0.347'  0.256-  0.:311
(5.101)  (4.624)  (1.950)  (2.254)  (3.396)  (0.653)  (7.737)  (4.815)  '2.566)
Tradable  Producers  0.076-  0.076-  0.047  0.044  0.067-  0.077
(7.714)  (6.424)  (1.355)  (0.830)  (6.160)  1'5.688)
Access:
Acessto  Int'l  Bond  -0,155-  -0.088-  -0.325-  -0.175'  -0.091''  -0.4.44'  -0.125  -0.073-  -0.248-
Markets  (-9.059)  (-7.003)  (-8.036)  (-6.780)  (-4.576)  (46.084)  (-5.026)  (-4.362)  1:4.366)
Access  to  lnt'l Equity  0.000--  0.000  0.000  -0.098'  -0.058  0.284  0.000  0.000  0 000'
Markets  (4.092)  (0.369)  (1.993)  (-1.698)  (-1.217)  (1.267)  (4.726)  (0.414)  11.916)
Financial Liberalization  and Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  0.084-  0.026'  0.030  0.054'  0.011  -0.062  0.079  0.045-  0.151-
(5.517)  (1.694)  (1.592)  (1.944)  (0.410)  (-1.295)  (4.525)  (2.619)  i2.455)
Mexican  Criss- 1995  -0.022  -0.023-  -0.017  -0.015  -0.028  -0.024  -0.022'  -0.018'  -0.030'
(-2.013)  (-3.039)  (-1.323)  (-0.672)  (-1.638)  (-0.900)  (-1.715)  (-2.067)  (-1.763)
Asian  Crisis  -1997  -0.018  -0.017'  -0.024'  -0.050  -0.039  -0.072'  -0.015  -0.017  40.017
(-1.378)  (-1.879)  (-1.685)  (-1.732)  (.1.855)  (-2.011)  (-0.957)  (-1.580)  (-1.031)
Asian  Crisis  -1998  -0.035"  4.0025'  -0.027  -0.059  40.072''  40.079"  -0.037  .0.033-  -0.033
(-2.061)  (-1.968)  (-1.526)  (-1.925)  (-3.139)  (-2.158)  (-1.491)  (-2.169)  (-1.257)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  40.092.  40.072'"  -0.107-  0.016
(-6.998)  (-4.123)  (-2.a46)  (0.214)
Brazil  -0.118''  -0.125...  -0.126-  -0.036
(-8.592)  (-6.947)  (-3.480)  (-0.527)
Indonesia  0.020  0.016  0.055  0.060"'
(1.372)  (0.758)  (3.671)  (2.973)
South  Korea  0.001  -0.0456  0.023  -0.007
(0.085)  (-2.098)  (1.266)  (-0.328)
Malaysia  -0.071  -- 0.093  ^  -0.102-  -. 0.93-
(-5.580)  (-5.246)  (-6.006)  (-4.345)
Mexico  0.081  "'  0.078-
(3.909)  (2.850)
C  0.952-  1.030  1.024-  1.077-  1.031'  1.1268
(32.736)  (26.115)  (17.423)  (10.366)  (26.347)  (21.419)
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.228  U.6i1  0.218  0202  0.538  0.152  0.2zr  0.13os  B:7T
Fixed  Effects  8.348-  6A438  9.327
Chi-Hausrnan  22.249-  39.422-  21.092-
Number  of Firms  799  799  799  238  238  238  526  526  526
Numberof  Observations  6137  6137  4442  1785  1785  1253  4116  4116  3033
Robust  standard  arars-WIlite  correction  tor  heteroskedasicty.  Thailand  is  the  base  coutry.  T-stattics  are  in parenthesis.
indicate  10,5,1,  percent  level  of  sgnificance,  respectvely.
Instrumental  variable  estimation  (IV):  instunients  are  lagged  explanatory  variables  of  Firms'  Characteristics  (except  the  vanable  Tradable  Producers),  lagged  values  of  tihe  vanable  Access
to Int'l  Equity  Markets,  and  an  indicator  ot  each  cointrys  access  to  intemational  bond  markets.Table V: Panel  Esdmalles  for Internal Financing
Dependent  Variable:  Retained Eamin  gsiTotal Debt
Independent  - - 0Pool  Latin America  and East  Asia  Pool Latin America  Pool  East  Asia
Variables:  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  VWithin  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firnns'  Characteristics:
Log of Net FixedAssets  .0.107  -0.105  0.021  -1.483  4.886  -1901.70  -0.027'-  0.001  0.041...
(.1.321)  (-1.434)  (0.365)  (-1.163)  (-1.467)  (-0.012)  (-3.814)  (0.062)  (-4.561)
Net Fixed Assets/Total  4.517  0.190  -1.383  40.096  3.413  3717.470  -0.053  -0.123  0.005
Assets  (-1.500)  (0.821)  (-1.348)  (-0.074)  (1.433)  (0.012)  (-1.448)  (-1.466)  (0.127)
Profits/Total Assets  5.442-  2.118  13.478  10.608''  1.957  3312.150  2.444-  2.482"'  2.471''
(3.683)  (1.439)  (1.468)  (2.148)  (0.703)  (0.012)  (12.969)  (8.703)  (6.705)
Tradable Producers  3.147  0.041  1.439  644.292  0.026B  0.035'
(0.916)  (0.381)  (0.882)  (0.012)  (2.801)  (2A51)
Access:
Access to Intl  Bond  .. 489  0.196  -2.522  -4A97  0.756  2654.600  40.008  .0.021-  0.056
Markets  (-1.062)  (1.302)  (-1.265)  (-0.606)  (1.137)  (0.012)  (-0.590)  (.3.086)  (1.443)
Access to Intl  Equity  D.000  0.000  0.000  -2.212  1.310  540.150  40.028  0.000  0.000
Markets  (0.127)  (40.777)  (1.022)  (40.775)  (C.104)  (0.012)  (-0.732)  (-1.342)  (0.679)
Financial  Liberalization  and  Crises:
Financial Liberalization  0.220'  0.132  0.046  10.339  L.222  13240.700  0.117-  0.085-  0.143-
(1.738)  (1.347)  (0.252)  (1.221)  (1.599)  (0.012)  (3.752)  (3.068)  (4.281)
Mexican Crisis -1995  1.487  1.431  1.741  7.308  5.297  1634.160  0.010  0.009  0.007
(1.063)  (1.364)  (1.006)  (1.082)  (1.363)  (0.012)  (0.440)  (0.472)  (0.261)
Asian Crisis -1997  -0.093  0.284  -0.239  -1.623  3.056  685.088  0.023  0.018  0.025
(-0.541)  (0.963)  (-0.985)  (-1.037)  ((.036)  (0.012)  (0.750)  (0.603)  (0.724)
Asian Crisis  - 1998  -0.062  0.458  40.340  .0.01  1.292  879.543  0.008  .0.011  0.011
(-0t.279)  (1.483)  (-0.904)  (-0.009)  (1.071)  (0.012)  (0.220)  (-0.328)  (0.283)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  3.605  5.542  -0.319  .6029.750
('1.539)  (1.589)  (-0.317)  (-0.012)
Brazil  0.287-  1.035
(2.621)  (14A00)
Indonesia  0.325  -0.511  0.362-  0.397-
(3.555)  (-0.715)  (9.169)  (9.195)
South Korea  0.830'  0.696  0.302-  0.365-
(1.894)  (1.630)  (8.973)  (9.968)
Malaysia  0.031  0.519  0.058-  0.027
(0.265)  (1.164)  (2.042)  (0.631)
C  0.087  -9.371  -0.091
(0.257)  (-1.138)  (-1.401)
-0.613  -12480.600  -0.067
(~~~~~-1.065)  (40.012)  (-0.742)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.150  0.015  01T  0.229  0.424
Fixed Effects  2.265  2.  44'  3.579-
Chi-Hausman  0.002  0.011  0.026  40.008  12.211-  0.314
Number of Firms  756  758  758  168  168  168  588  588  588
Number of Observations  5813  5813  4320  1251  1251  930  4466  4456  3249
Robust  standard  errors-Whits  ccrrredonrm  edasicity.  Thailand  is the  base  country.  T-slatrisics  are  in  parentesis.
Indicate  10,5,1,  percent  level  ot signiticarnce,  respesively.
lnstruaenll variable  estimaton  (IV):  Insbuments  are  lagged  explanato variabies  sof  ims' Charactedsis  (except  ts  varable  Tradable  Producers),  lagged  values t the  variable  Acssss
to Intl Equity  Markets,  and an  indicator  of each  country's  access  to intemational  bond  markets.Table VIA:  Bank-Based vs. Market-Based Systems (OLS)
Dependent Variables:  Total DebtWEgulty  Short-Term DUeWEquity  Long-Term DebtREquity  Short-Term  DebtJT.Debt  Ret. Eamings/T.  Debt
Independent  Variables.  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market
Firms'  Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets  0.122-  0.032  0.020  -0.079-  0.102-  0.111  .0.058.  -0.039-  -0.264  -0.028-
(2.902)  (0.628)  (0.810)  (-1.810)  (4.189)  (5.667)  (-6.379)  (-14.378)  (-0.814)  (-5.941)
Net Fixed Assets/Total  -0.634"  -1.2786  -0.474^  -1. 145-  -0.159  -0.133  -0.045  -0.185-  -4.455  0.062
Assets  (.2.720)  (.5.588)  (-2.930)  (-5.846)  (-1.578)  (-1.569)  (-1.341)  (-11.103)  (-1.610)  (1.916)
Profits/Total Assets  -1.791"  -9.539-  -0.989 ^  -7,625  -0.802-  -1.913-  0.290^-  0.159i  15.583-  2.951-
(-4.743)  (-3.395)  (-3.558)  (-2.885)  (-4.820)  (.6.864)  (3.672)  (4.012)  (1.973)  (17.672)
Tradable Producers  -0.011  -0.112  0.052  0.183  -O.064  -0.295-  0.092  0.077-  0.805  0.019*^
(-0.082)  (-0.377)  (0.656)  (0.665)  (-0.677)  (-4.220)  (2.509)  (7.448)  (0.523)  (2.040)
Access:
Access to Intl  Bond  0.220-  0.329  -0.011  .0.048  0.231-  0.377"  .0.139-  .0.163-  -0.540  0.019^
Markets  (2.070)  (1.553)  (-0.147)  (-0.354)  (3.552)  (3.494)  (-4.607)  (-7.790)  (-0.635)  (1.846)
Access to  lntl  Equity  0.486  0.000  0.412  0.000-  0.075  0.000  -0.041  0.000  -3.835  -0.039
Markets  (1.597)  (i.520)  (1.564)  (1.924)  (0.556)  (0.943)  (.0.621)  (4.041)  (.0.966)  (-1.027)
Financial  LiberalizatIon  and Crises:
Financial Uberalizalion  -0.558-  -0.694^  -0.209  .0.134  -0.349"  -0.560"  0.262-  0.070-  -1.533  0.097-
(-2.522)  (.2.058)  (-1.320)  (.0.480)  (-3.149)  (-3.935)  (4.413)  (4.473)  (-0A54)  (3.108)
Mexican Crisis -1995  0.114  -0.351  0.099  .0.361  0.015  0.011  0.014  -0.033-  7.079  -0.356
(1.172)  (.1.126)  (1.174)  (-1.225)  (0.369)  (0.304)  (0.597)  (.2.641)  (1.064)  (-0.252)
Asian Crisis - 1997  0.295  1.314"  0.141  0.798  0.154  0.516-  -0.011  -0.021  -2.305  0.031
(1.436)  (2.728)  (1.371)  (1.816)  (0.990)  (4.420)  (.0.306)  (-1.545)  (-1.215)  (1.043)
Asian Crsis  - 1998  0.274"  1.343-  0.100  0.763  0.174-  0.580"  -0.050  -0.032  -0.548  0.013
(2.093)  (2.094)  (1.203)  (1.422)  (2.428)  (2.400)  (.1.648)  (.1.555)  (-0408)  (0.340)
Country  Effects:
Argontina  -0.114  -0.298^  0.184-  .0.1 94-  5.282
(-0.665)  (-2.538)  (1.963)  (-4.887)  (1A14)
Brazil  .1.701"  -1.43r7  -0.264-^  -0.112-  0.144-
(-2.875)  (.2.574)  (-3.395)  (-8.186)  (5.446)
South Korea  0.583  0.436  0.147  -0.018  0.302-
(1.277)  (1.076)  (1.031)  (.1.096)  (9.958)
Mataysia  -1.338--  -1.138^ -0.200-  *0.069  0.029
(.2.928)  (.2.659)  (-2.643)  (-5.350)  (1.14g)
Mexico  -1.3b6  ^  -0.799-  -0.587-  0.064^
(-3.214)  (-2.130)  (-3.860)  (3.040)
C  1.437-  4.406-  1.271"  3.320^^  0.165  1.086"-  0.713-  0.965"-  4.382  -0.103
(2.313)  (10.811)  (2.853)  (10.712)  (0.567)  (5.275)  (5.894)  (32.474)  (0.584)  (-1.840)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.120  0.040  0.101  0.022  0.113  0.164  0.205  0.236  0.007  0.341
Fixed Effects
Chi Hausman
Numberof  Firns  143  656  143  656  143  656  143  656  139  619
NunnberofObservatioins  821  5316  821  5316  821  5316  821  5316  740  5073
it&st  Star.drd  V  ceneonan  ior nereronmedasictay.  annesra  mad  Thailand  are ihe  base  censy, hir bank-based  and  market  based  systems  respetivety.  T-statstics  are  In  parenihesis.
8ank-based  CDuntdi:  Argetina  and  IndDnesla.  Market-based  rruntries: ramz,  Malaysia,  Mexde,  South  Korea,  and  Thailand.
indicate  10,8,1,  percent  level  of signficance,  respecrivelyTable  Vl.B: Bank-Based  vs. Market-Based  Systems  (Within)
Dependent  Variables:  Total DebtVEguity  Short-Term  DebtWEquity  Long-Term Debt/Equity  Short-Term Debt/T.Debt  Ret. Earnings/T. Debt
Indeeendent  Variables:  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market
Firms'  Characteristics:
Log of Net  Fixed  Assets  0.064  -0.063  -0.040  -0.070  0.103  0.007  -0.026'  -0.019'**  -0.478  -0.023*^
(0.461)  (-1.104)  (-0.539)  (-1.402)  (1.372)  (0.380)  (-1.954)  (-5.997)  (-1.083)  (-3.118)
NetFixedAssets/Total  0.148  -0.263  0.083  -0.134  0.065  -0.129  -0.035  -0.097**  -0.372  0.107
Assets  (0.973)  (-0.638)  (0.997)  (-0.395)  (0.680)  (-0.863)  (-1.169)  (-3.138)  (-0.253)  (1.518)
Profits/Total  Assets  -2.163^*  -8A57**  -1.234-^  -6.984'-  -0.929***  -1.473***  0.108  0.195^^^  -6.944  3.117^*^
(-4.265)  (-2.484)  (-4.079)  (-2.168)  (-3.157)  (-4A81)  (0.963)  (4.610)  (-0.483)  (17.090)
Access:
Access  to IntI Bond  0.049  0.079  -0.072  -0.161  0.120^^  0.240^*^  -a.052**  -0.100^*  1.081  -0.021^^
Markets  (0.649)  (0.413)  (-1.361)  (-0.991)  (1.976)  (3.889)  (-2.175)  (-6.779)  (1.200)  (-2.277)
Access  to Intl Equity  0.045  0.000  0.017  0.000  0.027  0.000  -0.049  0.000  -0.104  0.000
Markets  (0.288)  (1.075)  (0.240)  (1.221)  (0.252)  (0.805)  (-1.082)  (OA92)  (-0.030)  (-1.049)
Financial Liberalization and Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  -0.410  -0.515^  -0.125  -0.400^  -0.285  -0.115  -0.015  0.025  -3.588  0.102**^
(-0.935)  (-2.040)  (-0.547)  (-2.233)  (-1.135)  (-0.820)  (-0.219)  (1.620)  f-0.744)  !2 923!
Mexican  Crisis- 1995  0.111  -0.104  0.082  -0.144  0.029  0.040  -0.003  -0.027..  6A77  0.001
(1.285)  (-0.583)  (1.319)  (-0.874)  (0.656)  (1.204)  (-0.149)  (-3.141)  (1.289)  (0.068)
Asian Crisis  - 1997  0.327**  1.323*  0.167^  0.725  0.160  0.598**^  -0.028  -0.014  0.142  0.045
(1.969)  (1.832)  (2.650)  (1.075)  (1.130)  (5.357)  (-1.007)  (-1.507)  (0.082)  (1.570)
Asian Crisis  - 1998  0.256^  1.631***  0.099  1.095*^  0.157'^  0.536**  -0.067**^  -0.006  1.535  0.017
(2.390)  (2.809)  (1.598)  (2.292)  (2.443)  (2.359)  (-2.682)  (-0.394)  (1.048)  (0.507)
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.441  0.162  0.563  0.138  0.242  0.410  0.572  0.606  0.083  0.476
Fixed  Effects  4.273^-  2.179**  7.037***  2.091  *  1.969**^  4.437^**  5.982**^  8.814**'  1.433^^  3.100^**
Chi-Hausman  0.302  0.209  0.294  0.417  0.253  525.41^*-  4.564  16.124^**  4.1196^*  1.150
Numberof Firms  143  656  143  656  143  656  143  656  139  619
Number  of Observations  821  5316  821  5316  821  5316  821  5316  740  5073
Robust  standard  errors-White  correctlon  for heteroskedastFcity.  T-statstlcs  are  In parenthesis.
indicate  10.5.1,  percent  level  of  significance,  respecUvelyTable VI.C: Bank-Based vs. Market-Based Systems (Instrumental Variables)
Dependent Variables:  Total Debt!Equtty  S_  ort-  .DebtReqty  Lorng-Term Debt/EquityS
Independent Variables:  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market
Flrms' Characteristics:
LogsofNetFixedAssets  0.181-  -0.039  0.032  -0.157"  0.149-  0.118-  -0.056"'  -0.034-'  0.432  -0.062-m
(2.932)  (-0.508)  (0.880)  (-2.354)  (4.344)  (4.617)  (4.525)  (-7.201)  (1.103)  (-5.801)
Net Fixed Assets/Total  -1.625-'  -1.762-  -0.926"'  -1.45A4"  -0.699-  -0.308"  -0.019  -0.204A  -12.371  0.148"
Assets  (-4.211)  (-5.773)  (.4A19)  (-5.926)  (-2.808)  (-2.314)  (-0.213)  (-8.396)  (-1.528)  (3.166)
Profis/Total Assets  -2.523-  -20.364-  -1.425'  -16.185-'  -1.098'  4.179  0.249  0.183  37.242  2.245-
(-2.274)  (4.613)  (-1.950)  (-3.880)  (-1.880)  (.6.526)  (0.989)  (1.409)  (1.262)  (6.081)
Tradable Producers  -0.030  0.330  0.096  0.577  -0.125  -0.247  0.100'  0.080-  0.097  0.048-
(-0.101)  (0.837)  (0.722)  (1.569)  (-0.613)  (-3.094)  (1.716)  (6.421)  (0.048)  (3.142)
Access:
Access to lnt'l  Bond  1.273-  0.784  0.552*  0.261  0.722"'  0.523-  -0.423'  -0.334A  -10.194  0.155"'
Markets  (2.674)  (0.917)  (1.739)  (0.326)  (3.044)  (2.669)  (4.070)  (-6.578)  (-1.207)  (3.866)
Access to Intl Equity  0.646  0.000'  0.59  0.000  0.087  0.000  0.312  0.000'  8.083  0.000
Markets  (0.395)  (1.671)  (0.618)  (1.579)  (0.110)  (1.614)  (1.428)  (1.961)  (0.934)  (1.386)
Financial  Liberalizatlon  and  Crises:
Financial LIberalizatIon  -0.860  -0.542  -0.566  -0.051  -0.294  -0.491  0.611  0.023  19.411  0.158"
(-0.892)  (-1.142)  (-0.639)  (-0.124)  (-0.728)  (-2.790)  (1.143)  (1.165)  (1.345)  (4.566)
Mexican Crisis - 1995  0.139  -0.798  0.119  -0.719  0.019  -0.079  0.001  -0.029'  6.137  0.004
(1.150)  (-1.277)  (1.298)  (-1.212)  (0.350)  (-1.5683)  (0.023)  (-1.844)  (1.002)  (0.222)
Aslan Crisis - 1997  0.326  0.873  0.145  0.435  0.181  0.438-  -0.018  -0.028  -4.475  0.029
(1.465)  (1.293)  (1.355)  (0.688)  (1.093)  (3.734)  (-0.472)  (.1.828)  (-1.510)  (0.883)
Asian Crisis - 1998  0.353"  0.664  0.160  0.392  0.194"  0.272-  -0.051  -0.025  -3.301  0.016
(2.110)  (0.984)  (1.460)  (0.609)  (2.436)  (2.633)  (-1.484)  (-1.205)  (-1.095)  (OA20)
Country  Effects:
Argentna
Brazil  0.068  -2A45-  -0.242  -2.142"'  0.310"  -0.303  -0249"  -0.119"  9.034  0.046
(0.226)  (-2.896)  (-1.069)  (-2.691)  (2.038)  (-2.600)  (-2.567)  (-6.433)  (1.367)  (1.161)
South Korea  0.040  0.000  0.040  -0.062-  0.411"'
(0.052)  (0.000)  (0.228)  (-2.698)  (10.556)
Malaysia  -1.789-  -1.637"'  -0.152  -0.088"  -0.054
(-2.694)  (-2.637)  (-1.419)  (-4.856)  (-1291)
Mexico  -1.530'  -0.877  -0.653-  0.062-
(-1.941)  (-1.214)  (-3.432)  (2.151)
C  1.808  5.376-  2.020  4.336"  -0.212  1.039"  -0.041  1.030  -45.677  0.034
(0.884)  (7.402)  (1.105)  (7.139)  (-0.240)  (3.692)  (-0.036)  (25.755)  (-1.340)  (OA08)
Adjusted R-Squarad  0.074  0.030  0.047  0.017  0.096  0.160  0.196  0.218  -0.003  0.329
FbIed Effects
Chi-Hausman
Number of Firms  143  656  143  656  143  656  143  656  139  619
Number of Observations  543  3899  543  3899  543  3899  543  3899  524  3796
Reoblst  standard  enors-White  oorrrtion  for  hetenoskedasttdty.  Indonesia  and  Theaind  are  She  base  Cmatry,  tor  bank-based  and  market  based  systems  nespecthavy.  -stetistas  are  in  parenthesis.
tank-based  csuntdes:  Argentin  and  Indonasia.  Market-based  counies:  Breatl Malaysia,  Mexiooe  Sosth  Koree,  and  Thaiand.
lnstrumants  are  lamed exptanatory  varitblas  an  Frms'  Charracdertacs  (exsept  ate  valatre  Tradable  Prmduers).  ls9qed  vtuaes  oe  the  ralda en  arsess  to intemetisnal  equty  markets,  and  an  Indisator  of  mussy'  access  to  bend  ma*kets.Appendix  Table l: Argentina
Dependent Variables:  Total Debt/Equity  Short-Term Debt/Equity  Long-Term DebtVEquity  Short-Term DebtVT.Debt  Ret.  Earnings/T. Debt Independent  Variables:  OLS  Within  OLS  WIthin  OLS  Within  OLS  Within  OLS  Within
Firms' Characteristics:
Log  of Net  Fixed  Assets  0.263...  0.605'  0.136-'  0.355'^^  0.127-^  0.119  -0.088...  -0.299'-'  -0.356  0.189 (4.406)  (2.851)  (3.114)  (2.828)  (4.485)  (1.288)  (-2.842)  (-2.884)  (-0.338)  (0157)
Net  Fixed  Assets/Total  -1.177"''  -0.007  -0.786-'  -0.373  -0.398-'^  0.536  0.070  -0.148  -5.048  6.515 Assets  (-5.188)  (-0.008)  (-4.644)  (-1.153)  (4.080)  (0-913)  (0.7-54)  (-0.741)  (-1.029)  (0-939)
Profits/TotalAssets  -1.681-'  -1.748-'  -1.112-^  -1.240"-  -0.571^'  -0.495  -0.099  -0101  16.931'  15.944 (-3.124)  (-3.197)  (-2.949)  (-4.416)  (-2.258)  (-1.186)  (-0.677)  (-0.475)  (2.476)  (1.429)
Tradable  Producers  -0.155  0.020  -0.176  0.038  -0.493
(-1.034)  (0.270)  (-1.484)  (0.721)  (-0.253)
Firm  Age  0.001  0.039^  -0.003  0.013  0.002-^  0.028'  -0.004  0.011  -0.031  0.771 (0.746)  (1.816)  (-0.260)  (1.088)  (2.081)  (1.921)  (-0.812)  (1.015)  (-1.082)  (1.292)
Domestic  Currency  Debt  0.406-^  0.315-^
(6.742)  (3.110)
Access:
Access  to Int'l  Bond  0.096  -0.005  -0.033  -0.065  0.127^^  0.064  -0.099^  -0.044  0.009  0.529 Markets  (0.997)  (-0.072)  (-04507)  (-1.347)  (2.063)  (1.273)  (-1.755)  (-1.203)  (0.011)  (0.635)
Access  to Int'l  Equity  -0.032  -0.140  -0.103  -0.061  0.092  -0.101  -0.071  0.108^  -0.930  0.486 Markets  (-0.209)  (-1.059)  (-1.223)  (-1.005)  (1.075)  (-0.898)  (-0.601)  (1.849)  (-0.585)  (0.170)
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  -0.739"'^  -2.065-^  -0.348-^  -1.267-^  -0.390-"  -0.432'  0.51  1***  0.000  2.578  -2.342 (-4.145)  (4.003)  (-3.078)  (-3.906)  (-3.848)  (-1.806)  (4.821)  (0.000)  (0.715)  (-0.274)
Mexican  Criss - 1995  0.108  -0.008  0.148  0.051  -0.037  -0.048  0.2i9o"  0.142.'.  1.301  1.064 (0.926)  (-0.125)  (1.356)  (1.096)  (-0.870)  (-1.156)  (4.956)  (2.774)  (0.593)  (0.443)
Asian  Crisis  - 1997  0.269  0.008  0.221  0.099  0.055  -0.080  -1.303  -3.948 (1.507)  (0.046)  (1.510)  (0.936)  (0.846)  (-0.747)  (-0.822)  (-1.447)
Asian  Crisis  -1998  -0.055  -0.176  -0.048  0.001  0.009  -0.162  0.445  -3.100 (-0.372)  (-0.679)  (-0.601)  (0.017)  (0.108)  (-0.900)  (0.386)  (-0.921)
C  0.982''  0.574"  0.416  0.000  1.874 (2.146)  (2.314)  (1.497)  (0.000)  (0.261)
Adilisteci  R_Snuiared  0.113  0.'i63  0.116  O.1  0.0r(  0.291  0.344  0.114  0.010  0.059 Flxed  Effects
Chi-Hausman  14.910'^  14.205^  16.781"'  16.141"'  8.866" Number  of Firms  63  63  63  63  63  63  60  60  63  63 Number  of  Observations  341  341  341  341  345  345  228  228  277  277 Robust  standard  errors-Whiite  correcton  for  heteroskedaslicity.  Indonesia  and  Thailand  are  the  base  country.  T-statstics  are  in parenthesis.
*,",-indicate 10,5,1,  percent  level  of  signrficance,  respecfivelyAppendix Table II: Argentina (Financial Development)
Dependent  Variables:  Total  DebtVEquity  Short-Term  DebtVEquity  Long-Term  Debt/Equity  Short-Term  DebtiT.Debt  Ret. Earnings/T.  Debt
independent  Variables: OLS  Within  OLS  Within  OLS  Within  OLS  Within  OLS  Within
Firms' Characteristics:
Log  of Net  Fixed  Assets  0.252-''  0.592"'  0.130-"  0.340"  0.120'''  0.107  -0.089*"  -0.309'"  -0.300  -0.085
(4.080)  (2.704)  (2.901)  (2.577)  (4.062)  (0.959)  (-2.889)  (-2.922)  (-0.273)  (-0.063)
Net  Fixed  Assets/Total  -1.159'  0.242  -0.778"'  -0.273  -0.384"'  0.708  0.076  -0.131  -4.448  13.520
Assets  (4.918)  (0.265)  (4.473)  (-0.796)  (-3.730)  (1.002)  (0.819)  (-0.642)  (-0.906)  (1.611)
Profits/Total  Assets  -1.719"'  -1.885"'  -1.116"'  -1.296^^^  -0.605*^  -0.573  -0.106  4.098  17.198^^  20.839
(-3.078)  (-3.199)  (-2.869)  (4.354)  (-2.321)  (-1.258)  (-0.700)  (-4A61)  (2.466)  (1.591)
Tradable  Producers  -0.143  0.030  -0.174  0.040  0.134
(-0.951)  (0.386)  (-1.466)  (0.769)  (0.068)
FirmAge  0.001  0.011  -0.001  0.001  0.002''  -0.002  -0.000  4.061  -0.035  -2.169'
(0.625)  (0.217)  (-0.403)  (0.056)  (2.013)  (-0.040)  (-0.910)  (-0.720)  (-1.171)  (-1.794)
Domestic  Currency  Debt  0.411"'  0.313"*
(6.860)  (3.099)
Access:
Arcess to Int'l  Bond  0.098  -0.001  -0.037  -0.061  0.136'^  0.062  -0.101  -0.049  -0.060  -0.303
Markets  (1.028)  (-0.014)  (-0.556)  (-1.215)  (2.229)  (1.146)  (-1.792)  (-1.293)  (-0.067)  (-0.260)
Access  to Intl Equity  -0.029  -0.141  -0.119  -0.059  0.098  -0.096  -0.085  0.122^^  -1.824  0.955
Markets  (-0.184)  (-1.102)  (-1.328)  (-1.040)  (1.042)  (-0.850)  (-0.713)  (2.111)  (-1.071)  (0.283)
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
Finandal  Liberalization  -0.928-  -2.030^^^  -0.465^^^  -1.226^^^  -0.458--  -0.392  0.491^  0.000  -5.912  -0.475
(4.469)  (-3.652)  (-3.552)  (-3.550)  (43.787)  (-1.291)  (4.491)  (0.000)  (-1.244)  (-0.057)
Financial  Development  0.506  0.353  0.308  0.150  0.193  0.361  0.090  0.616  12.816'  41.754-'
(1.486)  (0.523)  (1.476)  (0.536)  (0.937)  (0.649)  (0.853)  (0.846)  (1.679)  (2.218)
Mexican  Crisis- 1995  0.034  0.002  0.104  0.054  -0.066  -0.040  0.204-'-  0.211--  -0.036  0.915
(0.270)  (0.032)  (0.939)  (1.159)  (-1.178)  (-1.026)  (4.247)  (2.212)  (-0.014)  (0.369)
Asian  Crisis  -1997  0.167  0.040  0.159  0.114  0.016  -0.043  -3.392  -0.852
(0.871)  (0.229)  (1.061)  (1.008)  (0.197)  (-0.422)  (-1.545)  (-0.348)
C  1.207*-  0.704-  0.510'  0.000  12.062
(2.509)  (2.747)  (1.667)  (0.000)  (1.113)
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.12  0.58  0.119  0.714  0.078  0.314  0.343  0.714  0.037  0.096
Fixed  Effects  11.711'"  2.880-  5.745---  1.441--
Chi-Hausman  10.219-  12.708*-  6.768  16.847---  9.0764---
Number  of Firms  63  63  63  63  63  63  60  60  63  63
Number  of Observations  332  332  332  332  335  335  228  228  267  267
Robut standard  error-White  oecton  for heteros_edast_dty.  T-statistics  are  in  parenthesis,
The  variable  "financial  developmenr'  is  fhe interaction  of  domestic  finanGial  development  and  financial  Iberalization.
.......  indicate  10.5..  vercent  level  of  ninnifncance  re-ecOivelyAppendix  Table  III: Argentina  (instrumental  Variables)  1
Dopendent VariablGs:  Total Debt/Equity  Short-Term  DebtiEqulty  Long-Term Debt/Equity  Short-Term DebtfT.Debt'  Ret  Earnings/T.  Debt
Indepondent Variables:  IV  IV - FD  IV  IV - FD  NV  IV - FD  IV  IV -FD  IV  IV  FD
Flrms' Characterlstics:
Log of Net Fixed  Assets  0.128  0.111  0.003  -0.007  0.119"  0.114"  -0.080"  -0.082"  0.092  0.145
(1.367)  (1.129)  (0.041)  (-0.102)  (2.598)  (2.469)  (-2.114)  (-2.149)  (0.076)  (0.116)
Net Fixed  Assets'Total  -1.173-'  -1.129"  -0.608'  -0.581"'  -0.576'  -0.552-  0.176  0.180  -7.960  -7A57
Assets  (-3.131)  (-2.987)  (-3.027)  (-2.845)  (-2.223)  (-2.137)  (1.491)  (1.543)  (-1.299)  (-1.225)
ProfitstTotal  Assets  -2.712"'  -2.997"  -1.488"  -1.630"  -1.250"'  -1.380-"  -0.040  -0.054  27.634'  25.434"
(-2.637)  (-2.833)  (-2.109)  (-2241)  (-2.691)  (-2.S71)  (-0.125,  (-O.t69)  (2.213)  (2.07,0)
Tradable Producers  -0.119  -0.138  0.108  0.100  -0.224  -0.237  0.056  0.057  -0.806  -0.352
(-0.465)  (-0.534)  (0.905)  (0.836)  (-1.091)  (-1.144)  (0.840)  (0.859)  (-0.391)  (-0.171)
Firm Age  0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.002'  0002'  0.000  0.000  -0.030  -0.031
(0.058)  (0.039)  (-0.820)  (-0.886)  (1.778)  (1.803)  (-0.015)  (-0.044)  (-1.078)  (-1.116)
Domestic  Cunency Debt  OA39-  0.443"'
(5.235)  (5.362)
Access:
Access to Int'l Bond  1.047-"  1.021'"  0.638"  0.628"  0.424''  0.400"  -0.186'  -0.186'  -0.877  -1.651
Markets  (2.940)  (2.864)  (2.378)  (2.320)  (2.243)  (2.106)  (-1.961)  (-1.946)  (-0.328)  (-0.582)
Access to lnftl Equity  -0.635  -0.546  -0.521  -0.494  -0.052  -0.020  0.000  0.000  0.541  0.761
Markets  (-1.238)  (-1.081)  (-1.562)  (.1A78)  (-0.276)  (-0.105)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.217)  (0.278)
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
Financial Llberalkation  -0.497"  -0.971'"  -0.178  -0.433'  -0.318"'  -0.532-"  0.000  0.000  2.030  -5.522
,-.4  I  ~  . U/  2-..v5U/  -.- Af  .Uv  ~  LfU  -I  'G.000)  ,G.000)  (G.G4G;R  (-I.uv97
Financial Development  0.726  0.391  0.326  0.061  11A78
(1.572)  (1.331)  (1.382)  (0.369)  (1.584)
Mexican Crisis - 1995  0.217  0.140  0.225'  0.185  -0.006  -0.042  0.203'  0.197-"  0.786  4OA30
(1.613)  (1.001)  (1.837)  (1.516)  (-0.106)  (-0.643)  (3.828)  (3.493)  (0.360)  (-0.175)
Asian Crlsis -1997  0.321  0.206  0.264  0.202  0.069  0.015  -1.530  -3.384
(1.647)  (0.987)  (1.644)  (1.238)  (0.935)  (0.170)  (-0.916)  (-1.540)
Asian Crsis-  1998  -0.060  -0.039  0.006  0.224
(-0.314)  (-0.378)  (0.056)  (0.160)
C  1.456'  2.227'  1.074'  1.489"  0.426  0.754*  1.009"  0.978-"  0.904  10.045
(1.752)  (2.480)  (1.670)  (2.154)  (1.057)  (1.687)  (3.610)  (3.271)  (0.103)  (0.846)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.050  0.059  0.027  0.030  0.060  0.067  0.362  0.366  -0.011  .0.007
Fixed Effects
Chi-Hausman
Number of Firms  63  63  63  63  63  63  60  60  63  63
Number of Observatlons  278  269  278  269  282  272  167  167  274  _  264
Wih and  efthouA  Financial  Development
2 There  is not  data  tfr debt  arasency  deor,inaatr in  1997  and  1998.
Robust  standard  erors-Whito orrectrion  for  heturoskedasticty.  T-statislics  are  in parmnthesis.
The  varlable,'Inancial  develoPtnent  is the  interactim  ot  donesticfinanoal  develoProent  and  finanal liberaIzation.
.......  Indicate  10,5.1,  penrent  level  G1 significasnc,  respecivelyAppendix  Table  IV: Panel  Estimates  for Debt-Equity  Ratios  (Financial  Development)
Dependent Variable:  Total  DebUEquity
Independent  Pool Latin America  and  East Asia  Pool Latin America  Pool East  Asia
Variables:  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firms'  Characteristics:
Log  of  Net  Fixed  Assets  0.034  -0.049  0.006  0.045  0.000  -0.072  -0.007  -0.178  0.042
(0.898)  (-1.044)  (0.101)  (0.999)  (-0.001)  (-0.895)  (-0.161)  (-2.100)  (0.631)
Net  Fixed  Assets/Total  Assets  -1,
20
4..  .0.196  -1.739-  40.947-  -1.491-  -0.775*  -1.574  - 0.069  -1.963--
(-5.483)  (-0.543)  (-6.687)  (-4.564)  (-3.396)  (-2.260)  (-6.414)  (0.174)  (-7.379)
Profts/Total  Assets  -8.296-'  -8.095'-  -15.988-  -2.872-*  -2.346*-  -7.455...  -10.8086-  -8.784  .20.627--
(-3.382)  (-2.544)  (-4.507)  (-8.820)  (-6.188)  (-5.270)  (-6.208)  (-3.242)  (-3.992)
Tradable  Producers  -0.204  0.110  -0.222-  -0.367-  -1.064-  -0.070
(-0.785)  (0.318)  (-1.927)  (-2.125)  (-4.708)  (-0.297)
Access:
Access  to Intl Bond  Markets  0.340-  0.120  0.812-  0.104  0.032  0.801-  0.144  0.059  -0.494
(2.144)  (1.227)  (1.837)  (1.168)  (0.588)  (3.028)  (0.683)  (0.345)  (-1.250)
Access  to  lnt'l Equity  Markets  0.000  0.000  0.000-  0.650-  0.164  0.714  0.000*  0.000-  0.000-
(1.584)  (0.849)  (2.980)  (3.046)  (0.916)  (1.041)  (1.709)  (0.908)  (3.141)
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  -0.789--  -0.707  40.998-*  0.697-  -0.148  -0.702  -0.464  -0.440  -0.692
(-3.167)  (-1.495)  (-2.741)  (-2.254)  (-0.546)  (-1.159)  (-1.241)  (-1.063)  (-1.535)
Financial  Development  0.069  0.074  0.129  0.339-  0.335-  0.440  -0.072  -0.035-  0.043
(0.835)  (0.552)  (1.099)  (2.576)  (2.894)  (2.495)  (-1.531)  (-0.659)  (0.660)
Mexican  Crisis  -1995  4.268  4.108  4.520  0.007  40.008  0.054  0.234-  0.121'  0.001
(-0.861)  (-0.680)  (-1.047)  (0.098)  (-0.123)  (0.499)  (1.884)  (1.316)  (0.009)
Asian  Crisis-  1997  1.229-  1.116-  0.800  0.210  0.185  0.313^  0.937-  0.714  0.602-
(2.556)  (1.739)  (1.306)  (1.208)  (1.301)  (1.752)  (3.680)  (3.555)  (2.748)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  -1.272-*  -1.647--  0.196  4.492
(-4.998)  (-3.412)  (0.556)  (-0.759)
Brazil  -1.450-  -1.916'-  4.126  0.963-
(-3.315)  (-2.915)  (-0.518)  (-2.204)
Mexico  '1.1511  1.330
(-3.360)  (-1.936)
Indonesia  4.391  4.086  0.685-  0.383
(-2.094)  (-0.166)  (1.735)  (0.979)
South Korea  0.777*  0.149  1.944"  0.615-
(1.708)  (0.189)  (5.857)  (1.875)
Malaysia  -1.264-  -1.763-  0.000  -0.854-
(-2.084)  (-2.178)  (0.000)  (-2.204)
C  4.259-*  5.340-  2.260-  3.876-*  4.276-*  4.530-
(8.262)  (6.620)  (7.568)  (8.513)  (7.826)  (4.748)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.040  0.158  0.029  0.075  0.483  0.055  0.246  0.507  0.198
Fixed Effects  2.037-  6.866-  5.879-
Chi-Hausman  0.153  1.981  206.73-
Number of Firms  778  778  778  230  230  230  281  281  281
Numberof  Observations  5930  5930  4296  1713  1713  1210  2503  2503  2944
Robust  standard  ern-White  crrection for hetemskedasticity.  Base  country  is Thailand.  T-staistsrs  are  in parenthesis.
The  vanabbe  tnancial  developrnenr  is the interaction  of domestic  financial  development  and  financial  hberalizaton
indicate  1D,5,1,  percent  level of  significance,  respecfivelyAppendix Table V: Painel  Estimriates  for Short Term Debt (Financial Development)
Dependent  Variable:  Short-Term  DebtlEquity
Independent  Wo)tU;America  and East Asia  Pool Latin America  Pool East Asia
Variables:  6;  Within  IV  OLS  \WfIin  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firms' Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets  -0.068**  -0.059  -0.115"*  -0.005  _0010  -0.095"*  -0.096"'t  -0.125'  -0.100'
(-2.240)  (-1.530)  (-2.323)  (-0.445)  (4.941)  (-3.949)  (-2.644)  (-1.733)  (-1.738)
Net Fixed Assets/Total  -1j057***  -0.135  -1.410"*'  -0.964"'  -0.970***  -0.768-'  -1.433*"  -0.204  -1.458*"
Assets  (-5.582)  (-0.441)  (-6.917)  (-12.179)  (-3.376)  (-5.568)  (-7.800)  (-0.655)  (-7.176)
Profits/Total Assets  -6.522"'  -6.612"*  -12.462"  -1.522*'*  -1.191  "'*  -3.921  *"'  -7.748*''  -6.372  -14.9111-
(-2.818)  (-2.193)  (-3.724)  (-8.730)  (-3.135)  (-5.444)  (4.144)  (-2.491)  (-3.283)
Tradable Procucers  0.084  0.363  -0.148-'  -0.171''  -0.599**-  0.161
(0.352)  (1.131)  (-3.082)  (-2.567)  (-3.285)  (0.815)
Access:
Access to Intl Bond  0.026S  -0.083  0.297  0.011  -0.069"  0.473"*'  -0.020  -0.078  -0.691"
Markets  (0.253)  (-1.141)  (0.813)  (0.297)  (-2.158)  (3.218)  (-0.152)  (-0.681)  (-2.369)
Access  to  Intl  Equity  ().000'  0.000  0.000*"  0.101  0.109  0.203  0.000*"  0.000"''  O.00*
Markets  (1.916)  (0.956)  (3.384)  (1.453)  (1.252)  (1.044)  (2.040)  (0.957)  (4.079)
Financial Libaralization and Crises:
Financial Liberalization  0.20:2  -0.530  -0.349  -0.137'  0.011  -0.056  -0.059  -0.141  -0.127
(-1.302)  (-1.299)  (-1.615)  (-1.713)  (0.137)  (-0.330)  (-0.209)  (-0.434)  (-0.383)
Financial Development  0.035  0.052  0.081  0.114"*  C.113**  0.124  -0.087"  -0.088"*  -0.004
(0.348)  (0.411)  (0.755)  (2.117)  (2.373)  (1.564)  (-2.393)  (-1.898)  (-0.072)
Mexican Crsis-  1995  -0263  -0.133  -0.457  0.040  0.010  0.121**  0.173'  0.082'  -0.011
(-D.89C)  (-0.899)  (-0.968)  (0.790)  (0.241)  (1.979)  (1.773)  (1.218)  (-0.111)
Asian Crisis - 1997  0.752*  0.600  0.426  0.059  0.071  0.125  0.507"''  0.381  0.309*"
(1.705)  (1.000)  (0.743)  (0.792)  (1.316)  (1.539)  (3.126)  (3.195)  (2.197)
Country Effects:
Argentina  -1:222"'  -1.483"''  -0.052  -0.622"*
(-5.450)  (-3.684)  (-0.523)  (-3.225)
Brazil  -1.261  * *  -1.714"**  -0.044  -0.701"'
(-3.072)  (-2.776)  (-0.558)  (-4.368)
Mexico  4.705"  -0.758
(-2.401)  (-1.214)
Indonesia  -0.223  0.040  0.643"  0.535
(-1.331.)  (0.082)  (2.130)  (1.545)
South Korea  0.547  0.106  1.499"'  0.627"
(1.332)  (0.145)  (5.578)  (2.591)
Malaysia  -1.041'  -1.530"  0.000  -0.776*"
(-1.824)  (-2.024)  (0.000)  (-2.632)
c  3.169"'  4.183"*'  1.450"**  2.464"-  3.311  *'  3.577*"
(7.407)  (6.291)  (13.519)  (8.856)  (7.792)  (4.881)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.021  0.131  0.016  0.215  0.572  0.156  0.175  0.421  0.137
Fixed Effects  1.955**'  7.231"'  4.841"''
Chi-Hausman  0.348  1.108  0.932
Number of Firms  778  778  778  230  230  230  281  281  281
NumberofObservations  5930  5930  4296  1713  1713  1210  2503  2503  2976
Robust  standard errors-White worrection  for heteroskedastichy.  Base country  is Thailand.  T-stalistics are in parenthesis.
The variable 'financial development' is the inleraction  of domestic  financial development  and financial libera  rzaton.
indicate 10,5,1, percent level of significance, respectivelyAppendix Table VI: Panel Estimates for Long-Term Debt (Financial Development)
Dependent  Variable:  Long-Term  DebtlEquity
Independent  Pool  Ladn  Ameria and  East  Asia  Pool  Lain America  Pool  East  Asia
Variables:  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firms'  Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets  0.102'"  0.011  0.121'  0.050  0.010  0.024  0.089'  -0.053-'  0.155'''
(5.970)  (0.550)  (5.043)  (1.368)  (0.373)  (0.370)  (4.923)  (-1.315)  (6.313)
Net Fixed AssetslTotal  -0.148'  -0.061  -0.329'"  0.017  -0.521  -0.006  -0.141  0.272  -0.520.''
Assets  (-1.927)  (-0.497)  (-2.686)  (0.106)  (-1.567)  (-0.026)  (-1.135)  (1.912)  (-3.976)
ProfitslTotal Assets  -1.774'"  -1.483"'  -3.526-  -1.349'  -1.155'''  -3.533'"  -3.059-*  -2.412  -4.581'"
(-7.564)  (-4.968)  (-6.680)  (-6.101)  (-4.430)  (-3.513)  (-7.300)  (-5.599)  (-6.236)
Tradable Producers  -0.288''  -0.253-'  -0.075  -0.196  -0.465"-  -0.279'-
(-4.334)  (-3.330)  (-0.768)  (-1.328)  (-3.379)  (-3.177)
AcceSs:
Access  to Int'l Bond  0.313-'  0.203"'  0.514-'  0.093  0.101"'  0.328*  0.164  0.137'  0.160
Markets  (3.893)  (4.560)  (3.478)  (1.276)  (2.573)  (1.771)  (1.465)  (1.636)  (0.793)
Access  to lnt'l Equity  0.000  0.000  0.000"'  0.549"  0.055  0.511  0.000  0.000-'  0.000'
Markets  (1.111)  (0.665)  (2.206)  (2.554)  (0.516)  (0.864)  (1.206)  (0.805)  (2.371)
Financial Liberalizatlon  and Crises:
Financial Uberalization  -0.587"  -0.177  -0.649'"  -0.560''  -0.159  -0.646  -0.405"  -0.300  -0.556-'
(-3.673)  (-1.056)  (-2.722)  (-Z191)  (-0.734)  (-1.327)  (-2.644)  (-1.737)  (-2.917)
Financial Development  0.034"  0.022  0.047'  0.225*"  0.222"  0.316'-  0.014  0.053''  0.037'
(2.077)  (1.430)  (1.877)  (2.352)  (2.512)  (2.616)  (0.735)  (2.875)  (1.810)
Mexican  Crisis - 1995  -0.005  0.025  -0.063  -0.032  -0.018  -0.067  0.061  0.038*"  0.018
(-0.174)  (0.972)  (-1.605)  (-0.657)  (-0.417)  (-0.947)  (1.192)  (0.894)  (0.399)
Asian Crisis  - 1997  0.477"'*  0.516-  0.374"  0.151  0.114  0.188  0.430"'  0.333'  0.337-'
(4.350)  (5.295)  (3.564)  (1.091)  (0.964)  (1.350)  (3.248)  (3.332)  (2.934)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  -0.050  -0.064  0.248  0.131
(-0.639)  (-0.501)  (0.881)  (0.256)
Brazil  -0.189-'  -0.201"  -0.081  -0.261
(-2.941)  (-2.160)  (-0.429)  (-0.798)
Mexico  -0.445"'*  -0.572"'*
(-3.435)  (-3.155)
Indonesia  -0.168-'  -0.125  0.042  -0.178'
(-2.901)  (-1.328)  (0.216)  (-1.745)
South Korea  0.230'  0.043  0.444-'  -0.006
(1.831)  (0.252)  (2.877)  (-0.044)
Malaysia  -0.222'  -0.233'  0.000  -0.011
(-2.536)  (-1.744)  (0.000)  (-0.070)
C  1.091'  1.157"'*  0.810"  1.412**'  0.965*''  0.832*"
(5.051)  (3.521)  (3.344)  (3.349)  (3.464)  (2.053)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.180  0.424  0.164  0.043  0.425  0.024  0.241  0.485  0.211
Fixed Effects  4.311'  5.927'  5.401"'
Chi-Hausman  40.732'  1.49  6.774"
Number  of Firms  778  778  778  230  230  230  281  281  281
Number  of Observatons  5930  5930  4296  1713  1713  1210  2503  2503  2912
Robust  standard  errors-White  correction  for heteriskedasticity.  Base  country  is Thailand.  T-statistics  are  in parenthess.
The  variable  "financal  development'  is  the  interaction  of domestic  financial  development  and  financial  liberalization.
', indicate  10,5,1,  percent  level  of  signficance,  respectivelyAppendix  Table  VIl: I'anel Estimates  for Maturity Structure  (Financial  Development)
Dependent  Variable:  Short-Term  DebtiTotal  Debt
Independent  Pool Latin  America  and East  Asia  Pool  Laitin  America  Pool  East  Asia
Variables:  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  iNthin  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Firms'  Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets  -0.,042-  -0.021-'  -0.038-  - -0.030'  -0.014--  -0.014  -0.035-'  -0.023-  -0.044'
(-15.22,3)  (-6.672)  (-8.367)  (-6.626)  (.3.063)  (-1.390)  (-8.455)  (-3.671)  (-9.332)
Net Fixed AssetslTotal  -0.176"'  -0.099--  -0.187--  -0.314--  -0.227-*  -0.347-'  -0.194--  -0.083*-  -0.147-
Assets  (-11.081)  (-3.686)  (-7.964)  (-9.633)  (.3.719)  (-6.345)  (-7.434)  (-2.417)  (-5.557)
ProfitslTotal Assets  0.193-  0.190--  0.192  0.113-  0.190'-  0.183  0.290--  0.173-  0.286-
(5.11:2)  (4.585)  (1.617)  (2.019)  [2.940)  (0.680)  (4.814)  (2.593)  (2.265)
Tradable Producers  0.075'-  0.075'-  0.010  0.018  0.046-  0.082-
(7.494I)  (6.296)  (0.309)  (0.346)  (2.810)  (6.120)
Access:
Access  to Int'l Bond  -0. 154'-  -0.091--  -0.312--  -0.179-'  -0.095-'  -0.420--  -0.051-  -0.035"-  -0.234"-
Markets  (-8.916)  (-7.122)  (-7.901)  (-6.811)  ( 4.557)  (-6.061)  (-2.592)  (-2.289)  (4.300)
Access  to Int'l Equity  0.000--  0.000  0.000  -0.166--  -0.011  0.029  0.000'  0.000'  0.000
Markets  (3.957)  (0.045)  (1.323)  (-2.729)  (.0.248)  (0.163)  (4.217)  (-0.647)  (1.355)
Financial Liberalization  ;nd Crises:
Financial Uberalization  0122'-  0.062-  0.055"  0.136--  0.071-  0.012  0.137^-  0.096-  0.136'
(6.328)  (3.273)  (2.121)  (3.554)  :1.842)  (0.183)  (4.817)  (3.670)  (4.389)
Financial Development  -0.014'"  -0.013-"  -0.007'  -. 084"'  -0.054-  -0.052  -0.014"-  -0.014-'  -0.015'"
(-4.398)  (4.015)  (-1.658)  (-3.249)  (.2.281)  (-1.523)  (-2.669)  (-2.645)  (-2.942)
Mexican  Crisis - 1995  -0.013  -0.018"-  -0.015  0.002  -0.018  -0.010  0.009  0.002-  -0.021
(-1.165)  (-2.399)  (-1.112)  (0.104)  (-0.952)  (-0.359)  (0.445)  (0.125)  (-1.270)
Asian  Crisis - 1997  -0.013  -0.016'  -0.018  -0.046  0.040'  -0.057*  -0.021  -0.009-  -0.003
(-0.972)  (-1.649)  (-1.239)  (-1.470)  (.1.659)  (-1.676)  (-0.851)  (-0.523)  (-0.185)
Country  Effects:
Argentina  -0.134 '  -0.095-'  -0.174"-  -0.044
(-7.66t8)  (-3.889)  (-4.021)  (-0.549)
Brazil  -0.130"'-  -0.133"'  -0.113'  -0.052
(-9.166)  (-7.238)  (-3.319)  (-0.757)
Mexico  0.061-'  0.073"-
(2.87(t)  (2.510)
Indonesia  -0.011  0.004  -0.027  0.029
(-0.7113)  (0.152)  (-0.704)  (1.172)
South Korea  -0.002  -0.042'  -0.001  0.016
(-0.133)  (-1.859)  (-0.030)  (0.691)
Malaysia  -0.045"'  -0.078*'  0.000  -0.037
(-3.222)  (-3.936)  (0.000)  (-1.350)
c  0.924"'  1.013-"  1.016--  1.047-"  0.855-"  0.892-'
(29.553)  (23.132)  (18.226)  (9.115)  (24.008)  (14.726)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.230  0.600  0.221  0.217  0.540  0.178  0.279  0.621  0.278
Fixed Efferts  8.236-"  6201"-'  9.116"'-
Chi-Hausman  23.287-"  3.791  13.398-
Number of Firms  778  778  778  230  230  230  281  281  281
Number of Observatons  5930  5930  4296  1713  1713  1210  2503  2503  2976
Robust  standard  errors-Whitecorection  for  hateroskedasticity.  Base  country  is  Thailand.  T-statistics  are  in parenthesis.
The  variable  'finanaal  development'  is  the  interaction  of  domestic  financial  development  and  financial  liberalization.
indicate  10.5.1,  percent  evel  of  significance,  respectivelyAppendix Table Vil:  Panel Estimates for Intemal Financing (Financial Development)
Dependent  Variable:  Retained  Earnings/Total  Debt
Independent  Pool Latin America and East Asia  Pool Latin America  Pool East Asia
Varlables:  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV  OLS  Within  IV
Flrms' Characteristics:
Log of Net Fixed Assets  -0.127  -0.116  -0.004  -1.547  -. 910'  9.607  -0.023-  -0.012  -0.040-
(-1.269)  (-1.388)  (-0.083)  (-1.200)  (-1.690)  (0.826)  (-2.495)  (-0.857)  (-4.348)
Net Fixed Assets/Total  -0.495  0.232  -1.345  0.224  3.688^  -23.761  -0.017  -0.087  0.003
Assets  (-1.452)  (1.003)  (-1.342)  (0.167)  (1.723)  (-0.934)  (-0.249)  (-0.799)  (0.078)
Profits/Total Assets  5.658"  2.110  14.283  10.718"  1.792  12.467  2.739'*  2.840  2.601'
(3.416)  (1.418)  (1.456)  (2.036)  (0.638)  (0.579)  (10.319)  (7.616)  (6.881)
Tradable Producers  0.148  0.054  1.523  -0.279  0.049"*  0.031-
(0.91  1)  (0.482)  (0.889)  (-0.088)  (4.146)  (2.260)
Access:
Access  to Int'l  Bond  -0.445  0.196  -2.460  -0.687  0.728  -23.880  -0.051**  -0.016-  0.058
Markets  (-1.052)  (1.239)  (-1.265)  (-0.741)  (1.034)  (-1.032)  (-2.273)  (-1.496)  (1.495)
Access to Int'l Equity  -0.055  0.000  0.000  -2.517  0.224  10.574  -0.023  0.000'"  0.000
Markets  (-0.090)  (-0.679)  (0.717)  (-0.766)  (0.073)  (0.727)  (-0.436)  (-0.697)  (0.326)
Financlal  Llberalization  and Crises:
Financial Liberalization  0.739  0.260  0.922  11.035  4.164  -50.799  0.053  0.001'  0.128-
(1.356)  (1.185)  (1.095)  (1.171)  (1.524)  (-0.760)  (0.684)  (0.026)  (2.362)
Financial Development  -0.126  -0.027  -0.195  -0.632  0.271  -18.930  0.025-  0.028-  0.002
(-1.063)  (-0.746)  (-0.972)  (-0.327)  (0.157)  (-0.939)  (2.830)  (2.763)  (0.220)
Mexican  Crisis -1995  1.569  1.446  1.787  7.557  6.253  1.788  -0.011  -0.014'  0.006
(1.064)  (1.356)  (1.005)  (1.047)  (1.300)  (OA16)  (-0.239)  (-0.270)  (0.227)
Asian  Crisis - 1997  0.021  0.306  -0.072  -2.109  -0.065  -4.674  -0.047'  -0.026-  0.026
(0.098)  (0.953)  (-0.237)  (-1.173)  (-0.038)  (-1.297)  (-1.705)  (-0.887)  (0.730)
Country Effects:
Argentina  3.224  4.985*  -0.430  20.240
(1.574)  (1.679)  (-0.308)  (0.834)




Indonesia  0.102  -0.920  0.304'**  0.395-'
(0.554)  (-0.832)  (4.503)  (8.471)
South Korea  0.964'  0.931  0.253'  0.364-
(1.717)  (1.379)  (4.534)  (8.944)
Malaysia  0.276*  0.944  0.000  0.021
(1.703)  (1.088)  (0.000)  (0.442)
C  -0.425'  -1.618  -10.040  48.273  -0.065  -0.052
(-1.685)  (-1.051)  (-1.128)  (0.747)  (-0.797)  (-0.502)
Adjusted R-Squared  0.001  0.150  0.010  0.015  0.147  -0.011  0.196  0.425  0.319
Fixed Effects  2.255-*  2.143-*  4.543"
Chi-Hausman  0.01  0.039  0.385
Number of Firms  744  744  744  165  165  165  281  281  281
Number of Observations  5688  5813  4242  1230  1251  925  2503  4456  3186
Robust  standard  errors-White  correction  for heteroskedasitcity.  Base  country  is  Thaiand.  T-statistics  are  in parenthesis.
The  variable  'financial  development'  is the  interaction  of domestic  fnancial  development  and  financial  liberalization.
,-,-'indicate 10,5,1,  percent  level  of  significance,  respectivelyAppendix Table IX.A: Bank-Based  vs. Market-Based Systems (OLS- Financial Development)
Dowendent  Variables:  Tota De  qulty  gghor  rorm Do t  quiy  Long-Term  DebtEqulty  Short-Torm  T.at  Ret.  a  ng  D
Indopendent  Variables:  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market
Flrms'  Characteristics:
Log  of  Net  Fixed  Assets  0.103^^  0.020  0.020  -0.085-  0.083-  0.105  - -0.059-'  -0.039^^  -0.219  40.026w^
(3.224)  (0.463)  (0.903)  (-2.541)  (4.435)  (5.199)  (-5.624)  (-14.001)  (-0.781)  (-5.068)
Net  Fixed  Assets/Total  -0.813-  -1.282"  -0.671  - -1.152-  -0.142  -0.130  -0.062  -0.193'  -4.385  0.064"
Assets  (-3.226)  (-5.624)  (4.977)  (-5.901)  (-1.004)  (-1.530)  (-1.304)  (.11.297)  (-1.554)  (1.981)
Pronits/Total  Assets  -2.009'  9.59.62  -- 1  -7.666'-  -O.SS6'  -. 93 7'-  029G'''  I.u8'  tS.38-  2.  980'^,* 
(-5.124)  (-3.153)  (-3.922)  (-2.672)  (-4.962)  (-6.665)  (3.532)  (4.078)  (1.988)  (17.275)
Tradable  Producers  -0.038  -0.155  0.011  0.151  -0.049  -0.307"-  0.065  0.078-^  0.95"  0.0 1'
(-0.261)  (-0.520)  (0.150)  (0.549)  (.OA37)  (4.329)  (1.599)  (7A90)  (0.569)  (1.730)
Access:
Access to Intl Bond  0.241-  0.310  0.004  -0.054  0.237"-  0.364''  -0.140^-  -0.157"-  -0.733  0.018*
Markets  (2.616)  (1.352)  (0.062)  (-0.348)  (3.649)  (3.311)  (-4.400)  (-7A25)  (-0.755)  (1.656)
Access  to Intl Equity  0.077  0.000°  0.080  0.000-  -0.003  0.000  -0.099-  0.000-^  -3.906  -0.000
Markets  (0.489)  (1.692)  (0.979)  (2.130)  (-0.025)  (1.076)  (-1.736)  (3.939)  (-0.888)  (-1.134)
Financial  Liberalization  and  Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  -0.538"-  -0.806'^  -0.199  -0.186  -0.339^^  0.621-  0.248-  0.106-  8.570  0.072
(-2.719)  (-2.798)  (-1.496)  (-0.979)  (-3.151)  (-3.490)  (3.826)  (5.313)  (0.812)  (1.397)
Financial Development  0.035  0.077  -0.002  0.043  0.038  0.035"  0.016  -0.012-'  -5.885  0.005
(0.182)  (0.644)  (-0.015)  (0.376)  (0.386)  (2.006)  (0.303)  (-3.884)  (-0.756)  (0.745)
Mexican  Crisis  -1995  0.137  -0.396  0.121  -0.385  0.015  -0.011  0.011  -0.024*  8.858  -0.006
(1.237)  (-0.993)  (1.308)  (-1.015)  (0.304)  (-0.314)  (0.394)  (-1.861)  (0.988)  (-0.426)
Asian Crisis -1997  0.263  1.363-  0.107  0.833  0.156  0.531-  -0.022  -0.017  -1.303  0.023
(1.238)  (2.309)  (1.082)  (1.531)  (0.952)  (4.191)  (-0.584)  (-1.113)  (-0.832)  (0.699)
Country  Effocts:
Argentina  -0.123  -0.279^  0.156  -0.182--  0.157
(-0.580)  (-i.792)  (1.446;  ;-3.548)  (0-043)
Brazil  -0.158  -0.194  0.036  -0.079^^  0.132"
(-0.631)  (-0.862)  (0.803)  (-6.391)  (5.761)
Mexico  0.248  0.487  -0.238  0.093-
(0.514)  (1.131)  (-1.601)  (3.781)
South  Korea  2.094-  1.656"  0.438'-  0.027  0.276'-
(7.015)  (6.489)  (3.981)  (1A76)  (9.143)
Thailand  1.330-  1.101,  0.228^  0.046-  -0.019
(2.069)  (1.819)  (2.533)  (3.204)  (-0.611)
C  1.659-  3.121-  1.375-  2.213^^  0.284  0.908^^  0.765-  0.889^*  -10.163  -0.062
(3.001)  (8.874)  (3.560)  (7.875)  (1.018)  (5.589)  (6.099)  (39.106)  (-0.780)  (-1.110)
Adiusted R-Squared  0.116  0.039  0.111  0.021  0.090  0.178  0.203  0.237  0.007  0.345
Flxed  Effects
Chi-Hausman
Numberof Firms  140  638  140  638  140  638  140  638  139  605
Numbero'Observations  766  5164  766  5164  766  5164  766  5164  726  4962
Rotvmst  standard  errnrs.-Wite  sonrecodn  for  heierenkadasltdty.  Base  eunsny  is Malaysia.  T-slaiislcs  re in  parenthesis.
The  vadatble  tiancaia  develsymeat  is  the interaetsn  of  doMasti financial  denenoprnant  and  inancial  libelatisan.
Bank-based  rOuntides  Argentina  and  indonesia.  Market-based  countries:  Ereail.  MalaySia,  MeniCO,  South  Korea,  and  Thailand.
Indicate  1s51,  prcemi  lenel of  signiticance,  rspactivelyAppendix  Table  IX.B: Bank-Based  vs. Market-Based  Systems  (Within-  Financial  Development)
Dependent Variables:  Total DebtUEquity  Short-Term Debt/Equity  Long-Term Debt/Equity  Short-Term DebtIT.Debt  Ret Earnings/T. Debt
Independent  Variables  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market  Bank  Market
Firms' Characteristics:
Log  of Net Fixed  Assets  -0.173-  -0.049  -0.156'  -0.059  -0.017  0.010  -0.025  -0.021t--  -0.205  -0.020-
(-1.735)  (-1.020)  (-1.882)  (-1.489)  (-0.438)  (0.497)  (-1.311)  (-6.501)  (-0.653)  (-2.604)
Net Fixed  Assets/Total  0.630-  -0.428  0.292  -0.260  0.337-  -0.168  -0.086  -0.100---  -0.328  0.120'
Assets  (2.457)  (-0.987)  (1.599)  (-0.707)  (2.286)  (-1.150)  (-1A94)  (-3.273)  (-0.220)  (1.695)
ProfitslTotal  Assets  -2.593  --  -8.904"  -1.503..  -7.376"  -1090'-  -1.528-*  0.091  0.207--  -8.499  3.134-
(-4.885)  (-2A00)  (-5.055)  (-2.099)  (-3.172)  (4.469)  (0.710)  (4.691)  (-0.539)  (16.925)
Tradable  Producers
Access:
Access  to Intl Bond  0.088  0.122  -0.024  -0.122  0.112-  0.244-  -0.053-  -0.104--  1.140  -0.023--
Markets  (1.218)  (0.904)  (-0.528)  (-1.185)  (2.032)  (4.295)  (-2.106)  (-6.923)  (1.132)  (-2.474)
Access  to  lntl Equity  0.035  0.000  0.036  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.032  0.000  -0.112  0.000
Markets  (0.208)  (0.913)  (0.467)  (1.071)  (-0.007)  (0.662)  (-0.709)  (0.110)  (-0.031)  (-0.993)
Financial Liberalization and Crises:
Financial  Liberalization  0.023  4.772  0.090  -0.602  -0.067  4.170  -0.014  0.067...  4A55  0.055
(0.079)  (-1.451)  (0.377)  (-1.294)  (-0.485)  (-0.956)  (-0.182)  (3.481)  (0.707)  (1.179)
Finanrial  Development  0.238'  0.081  0.113  0.061  0.125  0.020  0.004  4.013--  -5.236  0.011'
(1.705)  (0.574)  (1.220)  (0.457)  (1A28)  (1.241)  (0.098)  (-4.168)  (-0.844)  (1.922)
Mexican  Crisis  - 1995  0.106  -0.173  0.082  -0.194  0.024  0.022  -0.003  -0.022---  7.984  4.003
(1.193)  (-0.803)  (1.215)  (-0.966)  (0.547)  (0.699)  (-0.135)  (-2.610)  (1.193)  (-0.171)
Asian  Crisis  -1997  0.269  1.236  0.119'  0.650  0.150  0.586--  -0.033  -0.013  0.929  0.041
(1.556)  (1.543)  (1.843)  (0.866)  (1.016)  (5.106)  (-1.044)  (-1.296)  (0.403)  (1.387)
Adjusted  R-Squared  0.451  0.160  0.572  0.137  0.233  0.431  0.571  0.605  0.079  0.476
Fixed  Effects
Chi-Hausman  18.628--  0.365  7.846-  0.611  18.158--  68.031'"  2.8347  19.77--'  3.443-  1.7139
Number  of Firms  140  638  140  638  140  638  140  638  139  605
Number  of  Observations  766  5164  766  5164  766  5164  766  5164  726  4962
Robust  standard  errors-White  correcton  for  heteroskedasUcity.  T-statistics  are  in parenthesis.
The  variable  "fnancial  development  is  the  interacion  of  domestc  financial  development  and  financial  liberalzation.
Bank-based  ceuntries:  ArgenUna  and  Indonesia.  Market-based  countries:  Brazil,  Malaysla,  Mexico,  South  Korea,  and  Thailand.
Indicate  10,5,1,  percent  level  of significance,  respectivelyAppendix  Table  IX.C: Bank-Based  vs. Market-Based  Systems  (IV-  Financial  Development)
Dependent Variablet  Total DeitiEqu6  t  hort-Term DebtjEgquit  Long-Ternn  Debt/Equrty  Short-Term DeWiT.Debr  Ret. EarningslT. Debt Indeend«"  sabiabl  Banj  Market  iank  Market  eank  Market  n  aret  a  aret
Firmns  Characteristics:
Log of Net FixedAsse  0.126"  -0.015  0.007  -0.137"*  0.119  - 0.122--  -0.0661  -0.034...  0.709  -0.057--- (2.355)  (-0.206)  (0.179)  (-2.308)  (4.305)  (4,393)  (-4.696)  (-7.161)  (1.219)  (-5.638)
Net Fixed  -1.479.  -.'795-  *  -0.878-  -1.504*  -0.6011  -0.291--  0.000  -0,210...  -12.638  0.141-
Assets/Total  Assets  (-3.479)  (-5.988)  (-3.774)  (-6.263)  (-2.181)  (-2.193)  (-0.005)  (-8.497)  (-1.508)  (3.126)
Profits/TotalAssets  -2.252-  - -1.381-  - -0.870  -4.305--  t 19Q  0A.65  36.427  2.327- (-2.208)  20.254---  (-2.040)  15.949-  (-1.532)  (-8.178)  (0.806)  (1.194)  (1.268)  (6.031)
Tradable Producers  -0.214  0.312  -0.027  0.552  -0 188  -0,240-  0.090  0.079-  0.650  0.043- (-0.705)  (0.756)  (-0.251)  (1.429)  (-0.756)  (-2.922)  (1.347)  (6.265)  (0.277)  (3.010)
Access:
Access to Intl  Bond  1.576.  0.247  0.651**  -0.209  0.925-  0.455*  -0.370*  -0.310  -11,837  0.138* Markets  (3.349)  (0.383)  (2.185)  (.0.380)  (3.698)  (2.340)  (-3.557)  (-6.486)  (-1.219)  (3.635)
Access to ltt  Equity  -1.342  0.000*  -0.420  0.000*  -0.922  0.000*  0.207  0.000  10.117  0.000
Markets  (-1.258)  (2.880)  (-0.865)  (2.957)  (-1.459)  (2.267)  (0.941)  (1.319)  (0.996)  (0.923)
Financial  Liberalization  and Crises:
Financial Liberalizati  -0.623  -1.126*  -0.470  -0.427  -0.153  -0.698.  0.511  0.045'  37.237  0.091 (-0.612)  (-2.753)  (-0.505)  (-1.614)  (-0.354)  (-2.755)  (0.927)  (1.669)  (1.232)  (1.643)
Financial Develoome  -0.029  0.177  0.011  0.120  -0.040  0.057"  0.069  -0.007  -10.556  0.013 (-0.100)  (1.322)  (0.047)  (0.971)  (.0.270)  (2.099)  (0.853)  (-1.470)  (-0.959)  (1.284)
Mexican Crisis -1995  0.219  -0.839  0.151  -0.738  0.068  -0.101  -0.011  -0.026  8.872  -0.001 (1.698)  (-1.229)  (1.569)  (-1.137)  (1.031)  (-1.974)  (-0.325)  (-1.684)  (0.989)  (-0.089)
Asian Crisi-  1997  0.299  0.756  0.127  0.368  0.172  0.388-  -0.024  40.022  -2.894  0.019 (1.339)  (0.994)  (1.173)  (0.515)  (1.036)  (3.194)  (-0.623)  (-1.412)  (-1.356)  (0.528)
Count.ry  Pff-us,
Argentina  -0.090  -0.296  0.206  -0.225*  0.312 (-0.267)  (-1.101)  (1.231)  (-1.988)  (0.072)
Brazil  -2,055  -1.S29  -0.226"  -0.126--  0.067
(-2.945)  (-2.791)  (-2.320)  (-6.728)  (1.829)
Mexico  -1.242  -0.662  -0.580*  0.056
(-1,674)  (-0.981)  (-3.006)  (1.849)
South Korea  0.047  0.032  0.015  -0.0601  0.389. (0.055)  (0.040)  (0.080)  (-2.519)  (9.771)
Malaysia  -1.957"  -1.697*  -0.261  -0.074-  -0.077 (-2.250)  (-2.087)  (-1.913)  (-3.659)  (-1.532)
c  2.042  5.726*  2.169  4.503*  -0.128  1.223*  0.197  1.012  -72.973  0.093 (0.988)  (6.275)  (1.159)  (5.839)  (-0.140)  (3.638)  (0.169)  (22.868)  (-1.267)  (0.868)
Adlusted R-Squared  0.050  0.029  0.048  0.016  0,054  0.158  0.211  0.221  -0.002  0.338 Fixed Effects
Chi-Hausman
Number of Firms  140  638  140  638  140  638  140  638  139  605 Number of Observalt  497  3799  497  3799  497  3799  497  3799  510  3732 RonSnutasndard  anrror-vNterroran  toSetnrenoiedanlrty.  sane  neauy  19  ThaHand.  T.bs5nnnarso  mpreun,esis.
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